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DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY 
Ari Ezra Waldman∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In Privacy on the Ground, the law and information scholars 
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan showed that 
empowered chief privacy officers (CPOs) are pushing their 
companies to take consumer privacy seriously by integrating 
privacy into the designs of new technologies. Their work was just 
the beginning of a larger research agenda. CPOs may set policies 
at the top, but they alone cannot embed robust privacy norms into 
the corporate ethos, practice, and routine. As such, if we want the 
mobile apps, websites, robots, and smart devices we use to respect 
our privacy, we need to institutionalize privacy throughout the 
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corporations that make them. In particular, privacy must be a 
priority among those actually doing the work of design on the 
ground—namely, engineers, computer programmers, and other 
technologists. 
This Article presents the initial findings from an 
ethnographic study of how, if at all, those designing technology 
products think about privacy, integrate privacy into their work, 
and consider user needs in the design process. It also looks at how 
attorneys at private firms draft privacy notices for their clients 
and interact with designers. Based on these findings, this Article 
suggests that Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s narrative is not yet 
fully realized. The account among some engineers and lawyers, 
where privacy is narrow, limited, and barely factoring into design, 
may help explain why so many products seem to ignore our privacy 
expectations. The Article then proposes a framework for 
understanding how factors both exogenous (theory and law) and 
endogenous (corporate structure and individual cognitive frames 
and experience) to the corporation prevent the CPOs’ robust 
privacy norms from diffusing throughout technology companies 
and the industry as a whole. This framework also helps suggest 
how specific reforms at every level—theory, law, organization, and 
individual experience—can incentivize companies to take privacy 
seriously, enhance organizational learning, and eliminate the 
cognitive biases that lead to discrimination in design. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Privacy on the Ground, Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre 
Mulligan showed that empowered chief privacy officers (CPOs) are 
creating strong data protection policies that put users and user 
trust first.1 Their research opened our eyes to the fact that 
American privacy law today is more than just statutes,2 Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions,3 and the litigation 
and policymaking of state attorneys general.4 Rather, where the 
laws on the books remain as fragmented and incomplete as ever, 
corporate CPOs are going further, filling in gaps on the ground.5 
                                                     
 1. KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: 
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 6 (2015) [hereinafter 
BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND]. Bamberger and Mulligan also 
published their initial research and preliminary arguments in the Stanford Law Review. 
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) [hereinafter Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books]. 
This Article pulls from both sources. 
 2. State privacy laws are too numerous to list. Federal privacy laws include, but are 
not limited to, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (credit 
histories), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1232g 
(school records), the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (personal information maintain 
by government), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522, 2701–2709 (protection against federal surveillance and electronic searches), and the 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (video rentals), among many 
others. For a more comprehensive list, please see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, 
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 37–39 (4th ed. 2011).  
 3. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 135–305 (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 627–28 (2014). 
 4. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 758 (2017). Bamberger and Mulligan’s research was 
international in scope; they interviewed CPOs from the United States and several countries 
in Europe. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 6. They 
found that American (and German) CPOs expressed a robust, user-focused and trust-based 
vision of privacy. Id. at 6–7. Because that narrative existed in the United States and seemed 
counterintuitive given the many gaps in U.S. privacy law on the books, this Article focuses 
exclusively on U.S.-based technologists and lawyers and makes recommendations for 
changes to U.S. law and corporate organization. Id. at 6.  
 5. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 6. 
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Their research, which is described in Part II, changed the 
privacy law discussion: previously, privacy scholarship mostly 
ignored the contributions of privacy professionals.6 But their work 
raises additional research questions. Have the CPOs’ efforts been 
fully realized? Are these robust, user-focused privacy norms 
embedded throughout the technology industry? And, are these 
norms being integrated into technology product design? 
Bamberger and Mulligan argued that American CPOs are 
taking advantage of gaps in U.S. privacy law to innovate and solve 
problems creatively, adopting a far more user-friendly approach to 
their companies’ data privacy obligations than the law on the 
books would seem to require.7 But that user-friendly approach 
does not always make its way into design; Snapchat,8 the initial 
version of Pokémon Go,9 and Uber’s mobile app,10 among others, 
seem to have been designed without our privacy in mind. In these 
cases, any “company law” of privacy is not being operationalized 
on the ground. 
This Article explores that divergence, some of the reasons for 
it, and how to fix it. CPOs may set policies at the top, and they 
may have the ears of corporate executives,11 but they alone cannot 
embed robust privacy norms into the corporate ethos, practice, and 
routine. Nor do they design the very data hungry products that 
scream out for privacy protection. There are other people involved. 
Engineers, coders, and other technologists create the platforms 
and products that sweep in user data. Attorneys work with their 
corporate clients to turn internal data use practices into privacy 
policies. A phalanx of product managers shepherd concepts from 
beginning to end. For a CPO’s vision of privacy to make its way 
into her company’s products, these workers have to implement it. 
As such, any narrative of privacy on the ground cannot stop with 
                                                     
 6. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 249. 
 7. Id. at 250–51, 304–05. Their research was international in scope. They found that 
German and American CPOs were able to innovate in ways their counterparts in other 
countries could not. Id. at 6–7. I focus on the domestic side of their work because my 
ethnographic research was restricted to the United States. 
 8. Complaint, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., FTC File No. 132 3078, Docket No. C-4501 
(F.T.C. May 8, 2014) [hereinafter, Snapchat Complaint], available at https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/cases/140508snapchatcmpt.pdf.  
 9. See Laura Hudson, How to Protect Privacy While Using Pokémon Go and Other 
Apps, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/technology/ 
personaltech/how-to-protect-privacy-while-using-pokemon-go-and-other-apps.html?_r=0.  
 10. See Lily Hay Newman, Uber Didn’t Track Users Who Deleted the App, but it Still 
Broke the Rules, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2017 6:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/uber-
didnt-track-users-deleted-app-still-broke-rules/ (discussing the Uber app’s use of 
fingerprinting to identify users even after they have deleted the app from their phones). 
 11. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 12. 
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CPOs.12 If we want the mobile apps, websites, robots, and smart 
devices we use to respect our privacy, we need to institutionalize 
robust privacy norms throughout the corporations that make 
them, including among those designing the products we use every 
day. 
What follows are the preliminary and partial results13 of an 
interdisciplinary study about the ways some designers and 
lawyers think about privacy and the factors that prevent—and 
those that foster—the institutionalization of robust privacy norms 
throughout a corporation. Relying on scholarship on management 
structure, the sociology of organizations, and my own field 
research in the form of semi-structured interviews and 
observations of product development, this Article makes three 
arguments. First, the designers and lawyers I interviewed think 
about user privacy narrowly and in starkly different terms than 
the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s study.14 Second, it is the 
designer’s vision of privacy that is operationalized into the 
products they create because they are the ones tasked with design. 
Third, factors both exogenous and endogenous to the corporation 
hinder the diffusion of robust privacy norms. Those factors are 
ambiguous privacy theory, lax U.S. legal approaches to privacy, 
siloed organizational structure, and isolated and homogeneous 
design teams. Changes in those four areas can provide the 
necessary incentives, enhance organizational learning, and help 
embed strong privacy norms throughout a company. In short, this 
Article suggests that a robust, user-focused vision of privacy can 
only translate into design if the designers are on board. 
The interviews on which this Article is based focused on 
technologists and lawyers in the high technology sector, including 
those working at leading technology companies, mobile apps, and 
tech start-ups. Many of them had similar views on privacy, the role 
of the user, and design. At the same time, their views were 
                                                     
 12. Id. at 83. 
 13. This Article is part of a larger research project on the role played by engineers, 
lawyers, marketing professionals, venture capitalists, and other workers in considering 
privacy protections and privacy principles in design. Interviews with these research 
subjects is ongoing. This Article focuses exclusively on interviews with engineers and coders 
designing technology products and lawyers who work on privacy notices. Future research 
will consider the broader population of workers on the ground. 
 14. This conclusion is not surprising, though this Article is the first to describe 
technologists’ vision of privacy and how that vision factors into design. In the intellectual 
property context, at least, there is evidence to suggest that creative actors tend to think 
about their work, process, and goals differently than those who make laws and policies 
about creative artifacts. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, 
AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (2015). 
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remarkably different from the views of the CPOs in Bamberger 
and Mulligan’s study. To many, “information privacy” boiled down 
to giving users notice, much like privacy law on the books.15 Many 
thought privacy was synonymous with encryption: that is, internal 
security priorities crowded out any consumer-focused privacy 
concerns. Few engineers remembered meeting with lawyers or 
privacy professionals one-on-one to discuss integrating privacy 
considerations into their work; some attended short assemblies on 
security, generally. Many found it difficult to design with user 
needs in mind; therefore, engineer-only design teams not only 
minimized the importance of privacy, but also missed how their 
designs impacted consumers.16 This research, discussed in more 
detail in Part III, suggests that, at least among most of the 
interviewees, Bamberger and Mulligan’s narrative about privacy 
has not yet been fully realized. 
There could be many explanations for this divergence of 
views. Part IV proposes a framework for understanding how 
factors exogenous (theory and law) and endogenous (corporate 
organization and employee experiences) to the corporation are 
hindering norm diffusion. Fortunately, changes in all four of these 
areas can help fully realize the more robust privacy norms from 
Privacy on the Ground. 
 As a matter of privacy theory, the dominant rights-based 
notion of privacy, or the idea that privacy is about giving users 
choice and control over the dissemination of their data, reduces 
corporate privacy obligations to posting privacy policies. Any 
ambiguity as to how to conceptualize privacy among those that 
recognize that privacy can mean different things to different 
people at different times makes it difficult for practitioners on the 
ground to turn theory into practice.17 However, conceptualizing 
privacy as based on relationships of trust would not only ground 
the CPOs’ vision of privacy with theoretical rigor, but also create 
a robust privacy-as-trust discourse to compete with the governing 
autonomy- and rights-based notions of privacy.18 
                                                     
 15. Telephone interview with former engineer at LinkedIn (Oct. 5, 2016) (notes on 
file with Author). 
 16. See Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A 
SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION 70–74 (John 
Law ed., 1991) (noting users are constrained and “configured” by designs of new 
technologies). 
 17. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2002) 
(“The difficulty in articulating what privacy is and why it is important has often made 
privacy law ineffective and blind to the larger purposes for which it must serve.”). 
 18. See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 11–45 (2018); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust 
 
Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)  2/12/2018  12:12 AM 
2018] DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY 665 
Law has a significant role to play, as well. Sectoral federal 
laws and the autonomy-based notion that users only need notice 
of data use practices in order to make disclosure decisions19 
provide little incentive for profit-seeking corporations to treat 
consumer privacy as anything more than a marketing gimmick. 
Treating some technology companies as fiduciaries of our data will 
change that.20 And, as we have seen with the automobile industry, 
a strong privacy tort regime can play a critical role in incentivizing 
corporations to fully integrate consumer safety demands into their 
culture.21 On a more immediate and practical level, my research 
shows that companies who have been the subjects of strong 
regulatory intervention are more successful at embedding the 
importance of consumer privacy into design. This opens a pathway 
                                                     
Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, at 451–57 (2016) (protecting privacy 
can build trust between online platforms and consumers); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as 
Trust: Protecting Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 
563–64 (2015) (arguing that privacy should be conceptualized as based on relationships of 
trust between individuals); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1308–10 (2000). For a discussion of how traditional conceptualizations 
of privacy are based on notions of autonomy, please see infra Part II.A. 
 19. United States data privacy law at the federal level is “sectoral.” That is, 
rather than a single comprehensive data privacy law, data is regulated only in some 
industries—health, financial, or children’s data, for example. Even where it is 
regulated, the laws only protect certain data in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Paul M. 
Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904–05 (2009); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, 
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 
SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 404–05 (1992). Notably, state laws 
are filling gaps left by a gridlocked Congress. The California Online Privacy Protection Act 
(CalOPPA), for example, regulates almost all platforms that collect data on California 
residents. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579. 
 20. Many scholars, including Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, Dan Solove, Danielle 
Citron, and others, have recommended a shift toward a fiduciary or trustee model to ensure 
corporations take consumer privacy seriously. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: 
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 102–03 (2004) (positing that businesses 
that are collecting personal information from us should “stand in a fiduciary relationship with 
us”); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183, 1186 (2016) (“[M]any online service providers and cloud companies who collect, analyze, 
use, sell, and distribute personal information should be seen as information fiduciaries toward 
their customers and end-users.”); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to 
Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/; Danielle 
Citron, Big Data Brokers as Fiduciaries, CONCURRING OPS. (June 19, 2012, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/06/big-data-brokers-as-fiduciaries.html (a 
fiduciary relationship between data brokers and users would help fight the massive power 
imbalance that exists in today’s unregulated environment). 
 21. Scholars have long argued for a more robust privacy tort regime. See, e.g., 
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1848 (2010); 
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J. 123, 182 (2007); Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are 
Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
63, 143 (2003). 
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for using robust FTC enforcement to make a difference. 
Endogenous factors also play a role. As a long literature on 
organizational structures and routines suggests, bureaucratic 
barriers within corporations may impede the spread of privacy 
norms.22 In the design context, siloed privacy structures and 
engineer-only design teams make it impossible for privacy 
professionals to raise and address privacy issues during the design 
process. And demographic homogeneity in design teams and the 
lack of ethics, diversity, and privacy education in technology 
curricula make it difficult for engineers to learn new perspectives 
and overcome discriminatory implicit biases. However, changes to 
corporate structure, hiring practices, employee social networks, 
and technology education can make organizational learning 
possible and help embed privacy norms among technologists. 
This research is limited. Ethnographic research—especially 
ongoing, preliminary research—always is. This Article is based on 
a subset of interviews conducted with engineers in the high 
technology sector. The views about privacy discussed herein reflect 
the views of the interviewees, and even though this Article is based 
on interviews with forty technologists and lawyers, the findings 
can only point to a vision of privacy among some designers and 
lawyers. Further research is necessary,23 and I consciously offer 
only modest conclusions as a result. But this research opens 
several scholarship and policy fronts in the fight to protect data 
privacy. A rich account of privacy on the ground adds something 
new to the privacy law discussion, highlighting the role lawyers 
and designers play in implementing privacy on the ground and the 
work that may still be necessary to fully realize the vision of CPOs. 
II. PRIVACY ON THE GROUND TODAY 
Bamberger and Mulligan conducted their research on 
corporate CPOs for two main reasons. First, most critiques of the 
American approach to privacy law had focused on the laws on the 
books and ignored the contributions of privacy professionals. Many 
of those critiques, furthermore, recommended a shift toward a 
more European-style comprehensive privacy regime without 
                                                     
 22. See, e.g., Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia and 
Organizational Change, 29 AM. SOC. REV. 149, 154–55 (1983) (routines as a source of inertia 
in organizations); Howard M. Weiss & Daniel R. Ilgen, Routinized Behavior in 
Organizations, 14 J. BEHAV. ECON. 57, 62 (1985) (discussing how routinization can cause 
inflexibility). See also MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
153 (A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons, trans. 1947).  
 23. That additional research will be discussed in the Author’s forthcoming book, 
tentatively titled, Designing with Privacy. 
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investigating the on-the-ground effects of the current approach. 
Second, there had been only one previous study of corporate 
privacy practices, and it was published in 1994. Much had changed 
since then.24 Their research not only updated our appreciation for 
an industry that was barely in its infancy in 1994, it also helped 
explain a paradox. In the twenty years between 1994 and Privacy 
on the Ground, which was published in 2015, the United States 
had not moved any closer to Europe’s privacy regime. And yet, the 
data privacy situation on the ground did not seem as bleak as the 
law’s harshest critics expected. Rather, a dynamic professional 
class of privacy leaders had emerged to create corporate privacy 
programs that seemed attuned to user needs. In this section, I 
briefly review the current approach to data privacy law in the 
United States and its critiques to put Bamberger and Mulligan’s 
research in context. I then briefly summarize their work. As I 
discuss later, however, their groundbreaking research focused 
primarily on CPOs and executives, leaving open a door to dig 
further into the privacy work of technologists, product managers, 
and lawyers on the ground. 
A. Notice-and-Choice and Its Critiques 
European and American approaches to data privacy are 
largely based on a series of Fair Information Practices Principles 
(FIPPs) that developed out of a 1973 report from the federal 
Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW).25 The 
HEW Report recommended that users be informed of data use 
practices, have the opportunity to correct their data, and consent 
to any secondary uses of their information.26 Several years later, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
issued similar guidelines, requiring, for example, that data 
gatherers disclose the purpose and scope of data collection, any 
security protocols, and all user rights.27 The FTC got in on the act 
                                                     
 24. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 249, 251. 
 25. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND 
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973), http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ 
[hereinafter “HEW REPORT”]. The Report was “the first portrait of information gathering 
and its impact on personal privacy ever provided by the U.S. government.” ROBERT ELLIS 
SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEBSITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE 
INTERNET 327 (2000). 
 26. HEW REPORT, supra note 25, at 41–42. 
 27. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD 
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA at 
Part II (2001), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyand 
transborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm. 
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in 2000, urging Congress to require commercial websites to 
disclose a similar what-when-how of user data.28 In so doing, the 
FTC identified “notice” as the most important FIPP, and 
notice-and-choice then became the dominant approach to 
consumer privacy. 
The federal laws that regulate the collection, transfer, and use 
of some of our data reflect this primary focus on notice-and-choice. 
For example, the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which helps protect the privacy of 
medical information,29 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which 
gives individuals notice and some control over information held by 
certain financial institutions,30 require covered entities to provide 
notice of data use practices. State laws follow suit. For example, 
California’s Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) is a 
groundbreaking law that requires commercial websites and other 
online service operators that collect information about California 
residents to, among other things, post a data use policy.31 Like the 
policies envisioned by Gramm-Leach-Bliley and HIPAA, 
CalOPPA-compliant policies must contain specific substantive 
disclosures: what information is collected, with whom it may be 
shared, how the data will be used, and how individuals will be 
notified about policy changes.32 
Notice-and-choice is premised on the notion of the 
autonomous user. As a doctrine of informed consent,33 it is 
supposed to give us control over our data by giving us the 
                                                     
 28. FTC, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON “PRIVACY 
ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE”, BEFORE THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION § III(1) (May 25, 2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-
federal-trade-commission-privacy-online/testimonyprivacy.pdf.  
 29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
100 Stat. 2548 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d(1)–(9)); 45 C.F.R. 164.528 
(2016). 
 30. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809). 
 31. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579. The law sets a de facto national 
standard because companies have an incentive to comply with the strictest law rather than 
navigating 50 different requirements. See Citron, supra note 4, at 762. 
 32. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(b)(1), (3). 
 33. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice 
Framework, 11 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 518 (2015). The principle of informed 
consent, as in the analogous contexts of medical procedures and scientific research, flows directly 
from Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means.” IMMANUEL 
KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 29 (2005), 
http://www.stolaf.edu/people/huff/classes/GoodnEvil/Readings/kantgw.pdf. See also Jorge L. 
Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (2016).  
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information we need to make rational disclosure decisions. 
Autonomy and choice animated the FIPPs and the Clinton 
Administration’s “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” 
which stated that “[d]isclosure by data-gatherers is designed to 
simulate market resolution of privacy concerns by empowering 
individuals . . . . Such disclosure will enable consumers to make 
better judgments about the levels of privacy available and their 
willingness to participate.”34 And the FTC has explained that 
notice is “essential to ensuring that consumers are properly 
informed before divulging personal information.”35 In other words, 
notice-and-choice was meant to give us the tools we needed for 
perfectly rational decision-making about our privacy.36 
Critiques of the sectoral and notice-and-choice approaches to 
data privacy focus on its underlying theory, substance, and effects 
in practice. As a theoretical matter, the notion of the autonomous 
user is a myth.37 And scholars have shown that we do not make 
perfectly rational disclosure decisions.38 For example, Alessandro 
Acquisti, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein have found that 
disclosure behavior is based on comparative judgments:39 if we 
perceive that others are willing to disclose, we are more likely to 
disclose;40 if we perceive that the information asked of us is 
particularly intrusive, we are less likely to disclose.41 Other 
scholars have found that disclosure can be emotionally 
                                                     
 34. HEW REPORT, supra note 25, at 41–42. See also President William Jefferson Clinton, 
A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce at 13, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 1997), 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html). 
 35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/exploring-privacy-roundtable-
series/priv-23a_0.pdf. Notably, these same Kantian principles animate the doctrine of informed 
consent in the medical and research contexts. 
 36. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012). 
 37. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND 
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–21 (2012) [hereinafter, “CONFIGURING THE 
NETWORKED SELF”] (as part of the governing principles of cyberspace); Julie E. Cohen, 
Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 225–27 (2007) (users are constrained 
by the built online environments around them); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S 
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 25–28 (1996) (as the foundation 
of political philosophy). 
 38. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics 
Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 
363–64 (Alessandro Acquisti, Stefanos Gritzalis, Costos Lambrinoudakis, & Sabrina di 
Vimercati eds., 2008); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in 
Individual Decision Making, 3 IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY 26 (2005). 
 39. Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John, & George Loewenstein, The Impact of 
Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 160, 160 (2012).  
 40. Id. at 160, 165, 172. 
 41. Id. at 160, 171–72. 
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manipulated: positive emotional feelings about a website, 
professional website design, the type of information requested, 
and the presence of a privacy policy correlate with a higher 
willingness to disclose.42 The law of notice-and-choice today 
ignores such contextual factors.43 
Notice-and-choice is also hopelessly underinclusive. It reflects 
an arbitrary and selective approach to the FIPPs, which also 
included limitations on data collection, security requirements, a 
rejection of black boxes, user rights to data, and robust 
accountability policies.44 Even in regulated sectors, current law 
does not cover all data. For example, HIPAA only protects certain 
health data held by certain covered entities, like health insurance 
plans, clearinghouses, HMOs, and company health plans. And it 
only applies to doctors if they electronically transfer information 
in connection with a transaction for which the Department of 
Health and Human Services has adopted a standard.45 It is no 
wonder that words like “patchwork” and “tangled web” are often 
used to describe the current state of data privacy law in the United 
States.46 As Bamberger and Mulligan pointed out, many scholars 
and advocates suggested that the best way to solve these problems 
is to enact a comprehensive data privacy law and shift toward the 
more robust data protection regulatory regime of the European 
Union.47 
B. Chief Privacy Officers 
One commentator recommending such a shift was H. Jeff 
Smith, a management scholar who published a study of privacy 
professionals in 1994.48 In the seven U.S. companies he studied, 
                                                     
 42. Han Li, Rathindra Sarathy, & Heng Xu, The Role of Affect and Cognition on 
Online Consumers’ Decisions to Disclose Personal Information to Unfamiliar Online 
Vendors, 51 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 434, 435 (2011). 
 43. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 236–37 (2010). 
 44. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD 
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, 
Part II (2001), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyand 
transborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm.  
 45. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–160.103. See also Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-
entities/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).  
 46. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carole M. Hayes & Masooda M. Bashir, A Comprehensive 
Empirical Study of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267, 27–78 
n.61 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan, Safe Harbors or Free Frontiers? Privacy and Transborder 
Data Flows, 59 J. Soc. Issues 263, 275 (2003). 
 47. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 259–60. 
 48. H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE 
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he found that few paid any attention to privacy and none dedicated 
significant resources to privacy protocols. While some corporations 
had no internal policies on privacy, others disregarded the ones 
they had. Smith also found that privacy considerations were 
noticeably absent in decisions about technology or business 
development. Privacy was, at best, an afterthought, and at worst, 
ignored completely.49 Smith argued that these failures could be 
traced back to the law’s “ambiguity” regarding what privacy meant 
and how companies are supposed to comply.50 Because privacy, 
like corporate social responsibility, generally, can sometimes 
conflict with more primary corporate goals,51 Smith suggested that 
a stronger, European-style regulatory approach was needed to 
force companies to take privacy seriously.52 
But Bamberger and Mulligan noticed that even as U.S. 
privacy laws on the books had retained their underinclusive 
approach, a lot had changed on the ground since Smith’s bleak 
narrative in 1994. An entire professional class of privacy 
professionals, led by CPOs and organized into large professional 
associations, had emerged.53 Many of them were C-suite 
executives, and they were being hired in all industries, from the 
financial and health sectors to retail.54 Law firms and many 
corporations now had robust privacy law practices. Privacy seals 
became sought after symbols of legitimacy.55 And extensive audits 
of corporate privacy practices were now part of the corporate 
routine.56 If these changes were not due to the Europeanization of 
American privacy law, what caused this shift? 
Bamberger and Mulligan asked the CPOs themselves. 
Through a series of interviews with privacy professionals 
recognized as leaders in their fields,57 they found that rather than 
                                                     
AMERICA 15, 25, 50–51, 209 (1994). 
 49. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 249–50 (citing 
SMITH, supra note 48, at 4, 82, 135–36, 139, 207, 213).  
 50. SMITH, supra note 48, at 139. See generally id. at Ch. 6.  
 51. See, e.g., Peter Arlow & Martin J. Gannon, Social Responsiveness, Corporate 
Structure, and Economic Performance, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 235, 236 (1982). 
 52. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 250 (citing SMITH, 
supra note 48, at 212–13, 217–18, 220). 
 53. Id. at 261–62. 
 54. Id. at 262. 
 55. Organizations such as TRUSTe issue privacy “seals” to websites that notify users 
about “what information is gathered/tracked; [h]ow the information is used; [and] [w]ho 
information is shared with.” Solove & Hartzog, supra note 3, at 593. 
 56. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 263. 
 57. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 11–12, 40–
43, 59 (on research methodology, including the focus on corporate executives and privacy 
leads). 
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having a corrosive effect on privacy on the ground, some ambiguity 
in the law allowed privacy leads to innovate and fall back on their 
creativity and judgment.58 They found that CPOs understood 
privacy to be more than just giving users notice59 and saw their 
companies’ responsibilities as more than just compliance. To the 
CPOs, legal rules provided a floor.60 And privacy was a constantly 
evolving user-focused concept about which they had to think 
proactively and strategically. Many of the interviewees felt that 
corporate privacy strategy was about maintaining user trust and 
being sufficiently flexible, adaptive, and forward-looking to meet 
consumer expectations whatever they may be.61 It was not about 
doing the least they could to prevent a lawsuit. Rather, they had 
to engage in ongoing management of risk and keep up with 
consumers’ changing expectations.62 Several CPOs talked about 
their jobs in fiduciary terms: they were “steward[s]” of data and 
“responsibl[e]” to consumers.63 They saw their primary objective 
as creating and maintaining “the company’s trusted relationship” 
with customers, employees, and society.64 In short, Bamberger and 
Mulligan found a profession of privacy officers earnestly working 
hard to advance the cause of consumer privacy within their 
companies. 
The CPOs saw three seminal developments that contributed 
to their robust approaches to privacy: the emergence of the FTC as 
a privacy regulator, the passage of state data breach notification 
statutes, and the rise of strong advocates and media interested in 
privacy.65 The FTC stepped into the role of de facto privacy 
regulator in the late 1990s pursuant to its authority in Section 5 
of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”66 Its growing portfolio of 
privacy actions has had a real effect on the ground: some of 
                                                     
 58. Id. at 12. 
 59. Id. at 61. To many of them, notice was not even a helpful concept. When dealing 
with ongoing use and analysis of data, notice as a legal requirement ceases to be relevant. 
Id. at 63. 
 60. Id. at 60, 64. 
 61. Id. at 59, 65, 67. See also Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra 
note 1, at 280. 
 62. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 67, 68. 
 63. Id. at 66. 
 64. Id. at 67. 
 65. Id. at 69–74. 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful.”). The FTC was given the authority to prevent such practices in subsection (a)(2). 
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
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Bamberger and Mulligan’s interviewees owed their jobs to FTC 
enforcement actions against their employers. But more broadly, 
the CPOs recognized that operationalizing privacy law meant 
more than just looking at federal and state laws; they also had to 
consider “FTC cases and best practices, including ‘all the 
enforcement actions [and] what the FTC is saying.’”67 And since 
the FTC has been adept at enforcing consumers’ evolving privacy 
expectations, especially as it has expanded its work from broken 
promises litigation to a broad range of consumer privacy protection 
cases,68 CPOs implementing this new “common law of privacy” 
followed suit.69 Together with the political and media attention 
that came with data breaches,70 this incentivized companies to 
take privacy seriously. An increasingly active, engaged, and 
professional privacy community then helped newly placed CPOs 
develop practices that would both respond to FTC requirements 
and help ensure public trust.71 
Bamberger and Mulligan also came away with some 
recommendations from their interviewees about how best to 
operationalize robust privacy practices throughout a company. 
The CPOs recognized two common threads: a powerful privacy 
lead at the top, with access to executives and the board, and 
distributed privacy responsibilities throughout a company’s 
business units.72 The most successful CPOs have the ear of the 
chief executive, report directly to the Board, and are accorded 
professional deference. They focus on developments in privacy in 
the wider legal and consumer space and translate what they learn 
into internal policies.73  
But to push privacy as a priority throughout a company, CPOs 
need to involve “business-line executives” to develop specific 
privacy practices for their units. This collaboration creates a 
distributed network of accountability. A majority of the 
interviewees told Bamberger and Mulligan that “senior executives 
in the business units” had primary privacy responsibility.74 Some 
companies also embedded employees trained in privacy issues 
throughout business units or employed unit-specific privacy 
                                                     
 67. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 69. 
 68. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 3, at 585–86, 590, 627–28, 649, 667, 672, 676.  
 69. Id. at 619–27. 
 70. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 71–73. 
 71. Id. at 73–74. 
 72. Id. at 76. 
 73. Id. at 77, 78, 80. 
 74. Id. at 83. 
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leads.75 Since they would always be closer to the action than the 
CPO at the top, distributed privacy representatives could spot 
issues early, respond to them, and integrate privacy into design.76 
III.   TWO PRIVACY NARRATIVES 
Bamberger and Mulligan’s important and insightful research 
suggests that empowered and innovative CPOs are creating and 
operationalizing a robust, flexible, and user-focused conception of 
privacy on the ground. They are heeding cues from the FTC, from 
each other, and from users, and embedding privacy into the 
products their companies create. As powerful as that narrative is, 
it leaves two questions unanswered, both of which suggest that 
Privacy on the Ground was a first step in a wider research agenda. 
First, if the privacy leads that participated in Bamberger and 
Mulligan’s research are approaching consumer privacy as 
thoroughly as they describe, to what extent have they been 
successful at integrating privacy throughout the culture of their 
companies? Second, how are CPOs, business-line executives, and 
unit-specific privacy leads “baking” privacy into design if none of 
them actually design anything?77 That is, Bamberger and 
Mulligan revealed an important piece of the privacy by design 
puzzle, but the engineers and other technologists actually 
responsible for integrating corporate mandates into design must 
also be part of this story.78 In this section, I tell the privacy 
narrative of some technology product designers. That story 
                                                     
 75. Id. at 84–85. 
 76. Id. at 86. 
 77. Ann Cavoukian, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, 
has argued that privacy by design is “the philosophy and approach of embedding privacy 
into the design specifications of various technologies.” ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
1 (2009); see also ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL 
PRINCIPLES (2009). 
 78. This distinction reflects the two aspects to every corporation’s routine. In this 
context, a “routine” refers to a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions, 
carried out by multiple actors. Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing 
Organizational Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 95–
96 (2003). Every organization deploys routines. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter F. Powell, 
The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983). Adopting Bruno Latour’s 
distinction between the “ostensive” and the “performative” aspects of behavior, Feldman 
and Pentland argue that executives are responsible for the “ostensive” aspect of routines: 
setting the tone for action, laying out a mission, and creating policies that form best practice 
guides. Then, routines are “performed” by workers on the ground: real people doing real 
work translating the mission into action, products, and widgets. Feldman & Pentland, 
supra note 78, at 95, 101. See also Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, 32 SOC. REV. 
264, 266–68, 271–73 (1984). Understanding the diffusion of norms through the routine 
requires studying both aspects, not just one. 
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suggests that perhaps Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s narrative has 
yet to be fully realized. From the user’s perspective, the CPO’s 
trust-based and forward-looking vision of privacy seems to run 
counter to both our experiences with technology products and 
privacy notices. And from the perspective of some of the lawyers 
and technologists in the trenches, it is not often part of the daily 
practice of design. In short, the vision of privacy held by some 
technologists and lawyers, particularly those in the high 
technology sector, is less robust, more reactive, and less central to 
their work than their CPO might hope. 
A. Designing Without Privacy 
As Woodrow Hartzog describes in his book, Privacy’s 
Blueprint, many of our favorite technology products are designed 
without our privacy in mind.79 They may not always be willfully 
and purposely designed to manipulate us or invade our privacy 
(although some are). Many of them just ignore us and fail to take 
account of our privacy needs and expectations. Either way, they 
may reflect an institutional approach that has yet to fully realize 
their CPO’s vision of privacy. There are countless examples. I will 
touch on four here. 
Snapchat sold itself as a privacy-protective platform.80 
Beloved by its core base of Millennial users in part because any 
image or video, or “snap,” sent across it automatically disappears 
after several seconds, the app theoretically offers powerful privacy 
protections for its users. Except, it was not originally designed that 
way. Before sending a snap, users were shown a screen that 
required them to designate the amount of time the snap will 
survive before disappearing.81 Snaps could not be sent without 
selecting an option. But, in fact, there were several ways snaps 
sent could be saved, downloaded, or copied.82 This gave users the 
                                                     
 79. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE 
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (forthcoming 2018). Selections of this forthcoming text were 
presented at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference on June 3, 2016 at the George 
Washington University Law School. 
 80. Snapchat is an image messaging and multimedia mobile app with more than 100 
million active users and 400 million “snaps” (audio or video messages) sent every day. Jason 
Abbruzzese, Report: Snapchat Valued at $10 Billion in Latest Investment, MASHABLE (Aug. 26, 
2014), http://mashable.com/2014/08/26/snapchat-10-billion-valuation/#rVMZROnUy5qQ.  
 81. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 6. 
 82. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 9–17. Much of the FTC’s case against 
Snapchat focused on the company’s failure to disclose certain data collection practices in its 
privacy statement. See id. ¶¶ 8–33. But broken promises litigation is just one part of the 
FTC’s privacy jurisprudence. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 3, at 667. As Solove & 
Hartzog point out, the FTC has developed a broader view of unfair or deceptive practices, 
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false impression, reinforced in the platform’s product descriptions 
and Frequently Asked Questions,83 that they actually had control 
over what their recipients could do with their snaps. 
Other aspects of Snapchat’s original design also reflected an 
institutional approach that neglected privacy. Until October 2013, 
it stored all videos in unprotected spaces on users’ phones, which 
allowed recipients to simply search for and download a video they 
wanted to save.84 Snapchat also allowed any third-party 
application to access its application programming interface and 
download or copy videos and images.85 Not only were these 
vulnerabilities not conveyed to users, but the platform’s design 
created contrary expectations. 
More recently, the wildly popular Pokémon Go app was also 
designed without privacy in mind.86 In its initial release, the 
platform accessed players’ smartphone cameras, collected location 
data, and, most notably, gained full access to players’ Google 
accounts, including email, calendars, photos, stored documents, 
and any other data associated with the login.87 The app was 
designed this way. In order to play Pokémon Go, players need an 
account. Accounts could be created in two ways: through 
pokemon.com or through Google. Normally, when an app user 
signs in using a Google account, a pop-up explains what data the 
app will be able to access, allowing the user to decide to go ahead 
or decline based on the app’s data use practices.88 That was not 
                                                     
including, for example, “deception by omission,” id. at 631, “inducement” to share personal 
information, id. at 632–33, and “pretexting,” id. at 633, to name just a few. Their persuasive 
argument is that “through a common law-like process, the FTC’s actions have developed 
into a rich jurisprudence that is effectively the law of the land for businesses that deal in 
personal information.” Id. at 589. 
 83. Snapchat Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 7–8. 
 84. Id. ¶ 10. 
 85. Id. ¶ 11. 
 86. Pokémon Go is a location-based augmented reality game where players locate, 
capture, and engage with virtual creatures called Pokémon who appear on screen as if they 
were really in front of the player. See POKÉMON GO, http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-
video-games/pokemon-go/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 87. See Valerie Strauss, Pokémon Go Sparks Concern About Children’s Privacy, 
WASH. POST (July 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/ 
2016/07/19/pokemon-go-sparks-concern-about-childrens-privacy/ (including a letter from 
Common Sense Media Founder James Steyer detailing some of the app’s privacy 
challenges). 
 88. These are called “just in time” notifications, and they are popular among privacy 
regulators. The FTC recommends them: “Providing such a disclosure at the point in time 
when it matters to consumers, just prior to the collection of such information by apps, will 
allow users to make informed choices about whether to allow the collection of such 
information.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST 
THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 15–16 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-
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the case with Pokémon Go. Rather, users signed in using Google 
and immediately proceeded to the game interface. The default 
permissions, which were hidden by design, gave Pokémon Go full 
access to the player’s Google account. The app’s developers said 
the broad permissions were “erroneous,”89 but even if that were 
true, Pokémon Go was still designed without privacy as a priority. 
Uber went even further. Uber designed its app to give the 
company the power to identify its users even after they had deleted 
the program. The technique Uber used, known as fingerprinting, 
leaves a small piece of code on a phone after deletion so the app 
developer can know if the same device ever reinstalls the app. It 
has non-invasive users: In Uber’s case, fingerprinting allowed the 
company to crack down on drivers who were downloading the app 
over and over again, creating new dummy accounts, and racking 
up ride volume. But it also allowed the company to individually 
identify specific users even after they had deleted the app.90 
Finally, although not an online platform like Snapchat or 
Pokémon Go, privacy notices are also designed without users in 
mind. Joel Reidenberg, Lorrie Cranor, and others have shown that 
privacy policies are difficult to read and understand. They are 
often written to be confusing, obscure, and inscrutable.91 They are 
also presented to users in ways that deter us from trying to read 
them in the first place.92 For the most part, privacy policies today 
are presented in small type sizes, without sufficient spaces 
between lines or necessary white spaces in the margins, without 
                                                     
federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf. There is also 
evidence to suggest that just in time notifications work. See, e.g., Rebecca Balebako et al., 
“Little Brothers Watching You”: Raising Awareness of Data Leaks on Smartphones, 
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 2–3, 8, 10 (2013). 
 89. See Laura Hudson, How to Protect Privacy While Using Pokémon Go and Other 
Apps, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/technology/ 
personaltech/how-to-protect-privacy-while-using-pokemon-go-and-other-apps.html?_r=0.  
 90. Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2pSAyyu. 
 91. See, e.g., R Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches 
Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 39, 40, 87–88 (2015) 
(presenting results of an experimental study showing that average internet users do not 
understand privacy policies and that even experts cannot agree on the meanings of certain 
terms). Cranor estimates that it would take a user an average of 244 hours per year to read 
the privacy policy of every website she visited. See Cranor, supra note 11, at 274 (2012). 
This translates to about fifty-four billion hours per year for every U.S. consumer to read all 
the privacy policies he or she encountered. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, 
The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563 (2008). 
 92. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 129, 
164–74 (forthcoming 2018) (showing how website and mobile app privacy policies are 
designed and presented to users in unpleasant ways that make it difficult for users to 
interact with them). 
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distinguishing headings or subheadings, and in colors that make 
them difficult to see.93 Privacy policies are written by lawyers, for 
lawyers. Users are ignored. 
Technologies like Snapchat, Pokémon Go, and the Uber app, 
as well as most privacy notices today, do not reflect the vision of 
privacy of the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s study. Rather, 
our privacy was, at best, a secondary consideration in design. This 
does not challenge the Bamberger and Mulligan narrative, but it 
does question whether the vision of the CPOs they interviewed has 
been fully realized throughout technology companies. 
Undoubtedly, many privacy leads are hard at work encouraging 
their employers to take user privacy seriously. I do not mean to 
suggest otherwise. But there is another, parallel process at work. 
While many corporate CPOs may be nudging their boards, raising 
privacy issues in executive-level meetings, and collaboratively 
creating privacy protocols with unit vice presidents,94 
technologists and lawyers are doing the work of privacy on the 
ground, designing products and notices for user consumption. The 
next section is based on qualitative research into how lawyers and 
designers in the high technology sector incorporate privacy into 
their work. It presents an account of a far narrower vision of 
privacy that is factored into design, suggesting that more work 
may need to be done to fully implement Bamberger and Mulligan’s 
research. 
B. Technologists and Lawyers Discuss Privacy 
Over a 16-month period in 2016 and 2017, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with nearly 80 technologists, all of whom 
are either current or former employees of technology companies of 
varying sizes, from Google and Facebook to start-ups, or 
technologists with product design experience at other companies, 
from home goods to online retail.95 This group included engineers, 
computer scientists, programmers and coders, and web designers. 
This Article is based on a subset of those interviews, reflecting 
designers who work or have worked for high tech companies.  
I identified these interviewees first via snowball sampling, a 
                                                     
 93. Id. at 136–39 (describing, among other things, the results of an informal canvas 
of 191 privacy policies from popular websites in a variety of industries, from media and 
entertainment to retail, from sports to news). 
 94. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 76–86. 
 95. Though the interviews all began with questions about the interviewees’ 
background, education, and work responsibilities, the discussions rarely followed a set 
script. That said, some of the questions I asked are attached at Appendix A (on file with 
Author). 
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non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects 
recruit additional study subjects from among their friends, 
acquaintances, and social networks.96 It can help researchers with 
limited resources identify target populations within a large, 
diffuse community,97 i.e., technology workers. Because 
network-based sampling techniques like this tend to identify 
individuals with particularly thick social networks—people who 
know a lot of other people in the same field98—the individuals 
identified have a high likelihood of being well connected, 
experienced, and knowledgeable in the research subject. Snowball 
sampling also has downsides; it tends to identify research targets 
that are similar to each other. Given that potential for bias, other 
methodologies were used. I attended technology conferences and 
approached random attendees, some of whom agreed to short 
conversations. By the end of my ethnographic research in the 
Summer of 2017, snowball sampling likely accounted for only one-
third of the total interviewees. 
I do not purport to argue that my sample is representative of 
the entire designer community.99 The interview responses cannot 
be generalized to cover all technologists or all lawyers. That, 
however, is not my goal. Like Bamberger and Mulligan, who used 
snowball sampling to find insight into the behavior of leading 
privacy professionals,100 I hope to open a window into how some 
technologists and lawyers factor privacy considerations into their 
work and how, if at all, some corporate structure can embed 
privacy norms into design. This research is intended to suggest 
that the role of engineers and other designers and their privacy 
narratives need to be studied further in the research agenda on 
privacy by design. I do not suggest that all engineers or firm 
lawyers think the same way. 
The interviewees all earned technology-related degrees, like 
computer science or engineering. The sample included no African 
American technologists—an ongoing problem in the technology 
                                                     
 96. See Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STAT. 
148, 148–70 (1961); James S. Coleman, Relational Analysis: The Study of Social 
Organizations with Survey Methods, 17 HUMAN ORG. 28, 28–29 (1958–1959). 
 97. Susan Welch, Sampling by Referral in a Dispersed Population, 39 PUB. OP. Q. 
237, 237–38 (1975). 
 98. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973). 
 99. Snowball sampling also comes with certain biases. Because it relies on social 
networks starting with the researcher and branching out from subject to subject, snowball 
sampling can underrepresent isolated or unique individuals or over represent those with 
similar characteristics to the original researcher. Welch, supra note 105, at 238. 
 100. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 1, at 264. 
 
Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)  2/12/2018  12:12 AM 
680 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [55:3 
community101—but did include diversity on other identity-based 
metrics, including ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation.102 
I also interviewed 14 lawyers at private firms whose portfolios 
included privacy and cyber security. I also reached out to attorneys 
at AmLaw Top 100 firms who listed privacy as part of their 
practices. These interviewees were particularly diverse along 
gender lines: 9 of the 14 who agreed to speak with me were women. 
They earned their degrees at a variety of law schools. All worked 
for firms with more than 50 employees.103 
I offered every interviewee the opportunity to discuss their 
views anonymously, pseudonymously, or with their real name and 
affiliation. All interviewees except one preferred some level of 
anonymity, either because they could not honestly respond 
without obscuring their identities or because they were in the 
process of or planning to apply for jobs in the technology sector. 
Therefore, I worked with each of them to find a descriptor that 
made them comfortable. All consented to some mention of the type 
of company they worked for—“a coder at a large technology 
company,” for example. Lawyers chose this option, as well, opting 
to be identified only as “a partner at an AmLaw Top 100 law firm,” 
or something similar. Pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, I 
respected all of these preferences in order to engage in honest 
discussions about their privacy-related work. 
Many of the interviewees described similar views on privacy 
and alluded to personal and educational biases and corporate 
barriers that, as discussed in more detail in Part IV, could hinder 
the institutionalization of robust privacy norms from the CPO’s 
office. Other interviews revealed ways in which privacy can factor 
                                                     
 101. See, e.g., Mark Milian, The Silicon Valley Diversity Numbers No One is Proud Of, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2014, 11:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-12/the-
silicon-valley-diversity-numbers-nobody-is-proud-of.html; Vauhini Vara, Why Doesn’t Silicon 
Valley Hire Black Coders?: Howard University Fights to Join the Tech Boom, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-howard-university-coders/. 
 102. I was able to include gender, sexual orientation, and gender expression diversity 
in the sample of technologists through my participation in Out in Tech, a nonprofit that 
provide resources and mentorship to ensure career access for LGBTQ individuals interested 
in technology industries. Several of the interviewees in this study responded to a request 
for participation sent through the organization’s mailing list. They helped connect me with 
other technologists, as well. Who We Are, OUT IN TECH, https://outintech.com/about/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2018).  
 103. This Article does not reflect interviews with in-house attorneys, although my 
ongoing research since has. My rationales for excluding in-house lawyers from this stage of 
the research project are as follows. First, Bamberger and Mulligan included the perspective 
of some in-house lawyers in their research. Second, the goal of this project was to reach to the 
very front lines of privacy work. That includes the products we use and the interfaces we see. 
Both of them are created by designers and technologists. And outside lawyers draft the privacy 
policies that form the legal relationship between technology platforms and their users. 
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into design and highlighted structural changes that make privacy 
more likely to be a priority in other companies.104 But, for the most 
part, technologists and firm lawyers thought about privacy in 
narrow ways, either as synonymous with encryption or limited to 
notice-and-choice. Many engineers found user privacy difficult to 
integrate into design, and many thought it was beyond the scope 
of their employment mandates. Corporate privacy structures, 
especially those set up as independent departments, tended to 
take laissez faire approaches to consumer privacy. Therefore, 
privacy decisions were made on the fly by engineers and engineer-
only teams, while privacy took on a compliance, check-the-box 
approach. 
1. The Meaning of “Privacy”.  When Bamberger and 
Mulligan spoke to CPOs at leading multinational corporations, 
they found a vision of privacy far more robust than the 
autonomy-based conception of privacy embedded in the law on the 
books.105 The CPOs recognized that privacy was not just about 
notice, control, or compliance. Rather “customer or . . . individual 
expectations” governed the corporate approach to privacy. The 
interviewees most frequently couched their understanding of 
privacy in fiduciary terms: privacy was about “respect[ing]” their 
customers, being “steward[s]” of their data, and “protect[ing]” the 
information they collected. Notably, the CPOs felt that privacy 
“equated to trust” or was a “core value associated with trust.”106 
To the extent that the technologists I interviewed had an 
understanding of privacy as a substantive concept—and many of 
them did not—it was fundamentally different from that of the 
CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s work. Several current and 
former engineers at major technology companies said that “privacy 
was not a helpful concept.”107 One was particularly incredulous: 
“What does the word ‘privacy’ mean? I don’t know.”108 A former 
                                                     
 104. It is worth noting what I mean by “factoring privacy into design” or “taking 
privacy seriously in design” or “integrating privacy protections into the design of new 
technologies,” phrases that I use throughout this Article. This project is primarily 
concerned with the design process and how, if at all, privacy issues are raised and solved at 
the design stage. It is true that design teams can consider privacy issues, but for whatever 
reason, do not code in a fix to the privacy problem. Although that is better than ignoring 
privacy wholesale, I am still concerned with the cultural, legal, structural, and social forces, 
if any, that prevented a privacy fix from making it into the final product design. 
 105. See supra Part II.A.  
 106. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 270–71.  
 107. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company (4) (Aug. 
18, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 108. Telephone interview with engineer at fitness technology company (Sept. 16, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
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engineer at LinkedIn agreed: “We all think about privacy, but I 
don’t think anyone has a clear idea of what it means.”109 
These responses could reflect the fact, noted often in privacy 
scholarship,110 that privacy is an ambiguous concept hard to pin 
down. Or it could be based on the lack of any privacy-specific 
education in many major technology degree programs.111 But 
many technologists did have a conception of privacy. I noticed two 
running themes during the interviews: privacy-as-notice-and-
choice and the conflation of privacy and security. Some, 
particularly programmers or engineers who had been promoted to 
team leader or product manager positions, thought that privacy 
was about “giving users notice about what was happening with 
their data.” A former product manager at Google now running his 
own start up agreed: “Privacy is definitely important. We have to 
give users the information they need to make decisions.”112 When 
an engineering team leader at a New York technology company 
responded similarly, he added, “or else how can you decide if you 
want to use my app or some Silicon Valley copy?”113 A senior 
engineer who used to work for Uber said that “we have to make 
sure you know what’s going on. I think that’s what we think about 
when privacy comes up: your ability to make the right decisions 
[about information] for you.”114 
Perhaps the best reflections of the technologists’ 
understanding of privacy were two responses on the issue of 
behavioral targeting, or the process by which advertisers track 
Internet users’ online activities and use that information to 
identify what kinds of ads they want to see.115 A former 
technologist at Facebook raised the issue on his own: “Look at ad 
                                                     
 109. LinkedIn engineer interview, supra note 15. 
 110. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2009) (“Privacy, 
however, is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means. Currently, privacy 
is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over 
one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over personal information, freedom from 
surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and 
interrogations.”); Waldman, supra note 18, at 565–88 (reviewing the literature on different 
conceptions of privacy). 
 111. See infra Part IV.D. 
 112. Telephone interview with start-up CEO (Sept. 19, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 113. Interview with engineer in New York (Sept. 23, 2016) (notes on file with Author).  
 114. Interview with senior engineer at Uber (Sept. 23, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 115. Behavioral targeting is “the tracking of a consumer’s activities online . . . in order to 
deliver advertising targeted to the individual consumer’s interests.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-
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targeting. People love it. Someone living in Southern Kentucky 
doesn’t want to see an ad for some artisanal cheese place in SoMa 
[the South of Market neighborhood in San Francisco]. Privacy to 
me means giving people the choice to get the best ads possible or 
to see things irrelevant to their lives.”116 Despite the privacy risks 
inherent in behavioral targeting,117 this technologist saw privacy 
as much more limited, as the seemingly easy choice between 
opting in and opting out. A former engineer at Google and 
Microsoft referred to this as a “dogma” that most engineers 
“actually believe.”118 Under such a dogma, consumer privacy must 
be relatively narrow: it misses the privacy concerns associated 
with data tracking and is, therefore, limited to notice-and-choice. 
Notably, this definition of privacy was shared by almost every 
lawyer I interviewed. A partner at an AmLaw Top 100 law firm 
saw privacy “as the notion that you should have some control over 
your data.”119 Her colleague followed up: “Exactly. Privacy is about 
companies giving you the tools you need to control dissemination 
of your data. We can help our clients do that by clearly and 
adequately laying out data use practices.”120 A senior associate at 
a small law firm specializing in internet and privacy matters 
agreed, stating that “privacy is about giving internet users notice 
about what will happen to their data. This allows them to go to 
another website if they want to.” An experienced partner at a New 
York law firm thought the question was straightforward: “Privacy 
is whatever the law says it is.” Though I found that response 
unsatisfying, this partner disagreed. “We spend a lot of time 
reviewing statutes, FTC actions, and anything we can get our 
hands on. The law is clear. Our clients have to provide users with 
notice and choice. It’s repeated over and over. And we help them 
do that.”121 
Another theme running through the interviews with 
technologists was the association of privacy with encryption. Nine 
technologists stated it explicitly; several others used words or 
                                                     
 116. Telephone interview with former technologist at Facebook (June 4, 2016) (notes 
on file with Author). 
 117. See, e.g., ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 115, at 2–6. 
 118. Telephone interview with former engineer at Google and Microsoft (Oct. 4, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 119. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (11) (Sept. 30, 
2016) (notes on file with Author).  
 120. Telephone interview with associate at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (Sept. 30, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 121. Interview with senior partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm, in New York, NY, (Sept. 
23, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 
Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)  2/12/2018  12:12 AM 
684 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [55:3 
phrases like “de-identify”122 or “add noise”123 or “security,”124 and 
one said that privacy was about “making data impossible to 
hack.”125 A programmer at a publishing company said that he “was 
taught that part of my job was going to be to encrypt the data we 
collected.” Another engineer stated plainly that many of his 
colleagues believed that “if I encrypt the data, it’s private.”126 The 
Linked In engineer stated: “My job was to prevent us from getting 
hacked.”127 An app developer said that his job was to “tell my 
engineers, my programmers, my data guys that the shit would hit 
the fan if we ever got hacked. Security had to be an important 
priority. Sure, we all need to make money and we all want to make 
money. But we’re not going to do that if we don’t secure the 
data.”128 
These two themes—privacy-as-notice and privacy-as-
security—are different from the motifs that came through 
Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s interviews. Trust, though a 
watchword among scholars and CPOs, only came up in terms of 
providing users with notice. The latter group, which consistently 
defined a “company” definition of privacy as consistent with user 
expectations and evolving notions of responsibility and trust,129 
wanted their organizations to go beyond notice, choice, and 
security. Indeed, several of Bamberger’s and Mulligan’s 
interviewees felt that discussions about “security,” “notice,” and 
“consent,”130 the outer limits of the firm lawyers’ and technologists’ 
understanding of privacy, played “limited role[s]” in the ways their 
companies approached privacy questions,131 especially when it 
came to the ongoing use and manipulation of collected data.132 This 
divergence suggests that the CPO’s vision of privacy has not yet 
been fully realized among the lawyers and technologists doing the 
                                                     
 122. Interview with member of trust and security team at Bloomberg LP, in New York, 
NY (Oct. 17, 2016) (notes on file with Author). De-identification is a common security and 
encryption tool. It does not always work. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: 
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1701, 1716–31 
(2010) (discussing the failure of anonymization and the implications for privacy law). 
 123. Silicon Valley engineer (4) interview, supra note 107. 
 124. Telephone interview with former engineer at Google and Microsoft (Oct. 4, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 125. Interview with member of trust and security team at Bloomberg LP, supra note 122. 
 126. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124. 
 127. LinkedIn engineer interview, supra note 15. 
 128. Telephone interview with app developer (Aug. 19, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 129. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 270. 
 130. Id. at 266–67. 
 131. Id. at 266. 
 132. Id. at 267. 
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work of privacy on the ground. The ways, if any, in which these 
understandings of privacy impacted the design process is the 
subject of the next section. 
2. Privacy and the Design Process.  The CPOs interviewed in 
Privacy on the Ground earnestly wanted to include their concern 
for privacy into the design process. They created robust and 
integrated policies to do so. They embedded privacy personnel into 
different business units or geographic centers to “position[ ] 
privacy as a design requirement.”133 In addition, the CPOs worked 
with unit vice presidents and others trained in privacy issues to 
“identify items for consideration” and develop “appropriate 
business-level policies.”134 Some companies went further, creating 
privacy “checkpoints” and “privacy impact assessment” tools that 
included questions to ask and answer during the design process to 
elevate privacy on the priority ladder.135 
These are excellent ideas that could, theoretically, help embed 
privacy norms throughout a company.136 However, at least at 
many of the companies represented in my interviews with 
technologists, these policies and tools either existed, but were 
never used, or did not exist at all. The integration of privacy issues 
into technologists’ work was often limited to the onboarding 
process. Privacy professionals or other personnel trained in 
privacy rarely met with engineers and programmers, even during 
weeks of intense design work. At companies that created privacy 
teams that were supposed to “insinuate” themselves into design,137 
high turnover, a laissez-faire attitude, and corporate silos kept 
privacy mostly orthogonal to design. And where privacy concerns 
were flagged, decisions were made on the fly by engineers with no 
privacy training.138 
Engineers working at start-ups “didn’t really think about 
                                                     
 133. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 85–86.  
 134. Id. at 84–86. 
 135. Id. at 86.  
 136. However, they reflect a rather superficial understanding of the weaknesses of 
organizational routines. As discussed in more detail in Part IV.C, structural changes to 
corporate organization can help diffuse and embed robust privacy norms if they focus on 
increasing organizational learning and rely on interpersonal trust. 
 137. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 85–86. 
 138. When responding to questions about corporate privacy and integrating privacy 
into design, many technologists were particularly concerned about their anonymity. Several 
respondents noted the high level of turnover at many technology companies and the 
possibility that they could return to their former employers. As such, these technologists 
requested that when it came to talking about company policies, that they not be identified 
at all. All interviews, with appropriate redactions are on file with the Author. 
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privacy.” Nor did the executives, for that matter.139 Larger 
companies that say they take privacy seriously had a different 
problem: prioritization. Privacy was simply not a top priority for 
engineers because it was crowded out by other mandates. 
Engineers and start-up executives repeatedly spoke of the need to 
collect data to optimize user experience: “we looked at data to see 
what people are interested in, what they’re clicking on, and where 
they’re going so we can make the site better. When we had some 
privacy issue come up, it was added to the engineering queue. But 
engineers had to prioritize speed, agility, functionality.”140 A 
computer programmer with experience at start-ups and at larger 
companies noted that “we would work nonstop. I had a thousand 
things to do, and this (privacy) was one of them. It wasn’t essential 
to our success, so it didn’t get done.”141 
Many more established companies that are supposed to have 
policies to ensure customer privacy factored into design work did 
not always implement them: “does asking [a] question mean there 
were policies?”142 Sarcasm aside, many engineers were simply not 
aware of checklists or assessments to help them integrate privacy 
concerns into their work. The response from an engineer formerly 
at a sharing economy company represented the views of a plurality 
of the interviewees: 
[Such policies] would have been great. That really could have 
helped us avoid some problems and think more globally or 
holistically about our work. But I can tell you that nothing 
like that ever existed. If it did, I have to imagine I would have 
heard about it. But I never did, and no one ever stopped me 
and said, ‘here, use these.’143 
That said, eleven interviewees recalled that privacy was 
discussed, but only during onboarding. “I remember being told at 
some point that we should think about privacy issues, but I think 
that was limited to the first week,”144 one said. A web designer  
said that she “was told to think about privacy during a five-minute 
talk during onboarding. I don’t think the word, or anything like it, 
                                                     
 139. Interview with former general counsel at New York technology company, New 
York, NY (Oct. 28, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Interview with former programmer at New York start-up, New York, NY (June 
24, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 142. Telephone interview with former computer programmer at online retailer (June 
18, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 143. Telephone interview with engineer at large sharing economy company (Sept. 22, 
2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 144. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company 2 (Sept. 
9, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
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was ever mentioned again.”145 Another “watched a 5-minute video 
about handling sensitive information;”146 yet another recalled that 
her entire privacy orientation boiled down to “a warning: don’t 
carelessly leave sensitive stuff at the gym, even in our gym.”147 
Other interviewees reported similar problems at other companies. 
Interviewees used words and phrases like “hands off,” “absent,” 
“uninvolved,” and “not really a factor,” to describe their employers’ 
approach to privacy. And, according to media reports, privacy is 
not even part of Facebook’s famous bi-monthly “bootcamp” for new 
engineers.148 
Interviewing several former designers at Google offered a 
deeper picture of the company’s approach to privacy from 2010 to 
2016. In reaction to several privacy failures, Google created a 
privacy team in 2010,149 and the company has routinely pointed to 
the team’s large footprint as evidence of its commitment to user 
privacy.150 But according to several interviewees, privacy at 
Google was much more oriented toward compliance and security 
than a robust, user-focused vision of privacy in design. 
Google says that it has a privacy infrastructure that appears 
similar to a variant described by Bamberger and Mulligan 
described in Privacy on the Ground. Their interviews with CPOs 
revealed that some companies try to embed privacy norms with 
“full-time privacy subject-matter experts” that help business units 
with privacy issues in real time.151 Google does that through a 
privacy team, which, until recently, was run by Alma Whitten, 
who earned a doctorate in computer science from Carnegie 
Mellon.152 It is now run by another security-focused technologist, 
                                                     
 145. Interview with web designer, (Oct. 9, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 146. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124. 
 147. Telephone interview with computer programmer (June 27, 2016) (notes on file 
with Author). 
 148. See J. O’Dell, Bootcamp! How Facebook Indoctrinates Every New Engineer It 
Hires, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 2, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/03/02/ 
facebook-bootcamp/. 
 149. Google’s privacy infrastructure was created as part of a $22.5 million settlement with 
the FTC for breaking various privacy promises. See Decision and Order, In the Matter of 
Facebook, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 0923184, Docket No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf; Press 
Release, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It 
Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-
settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.  
 150. See Glenn Chapman, New Google Security Chief Looks for Balance with Privacy, 
PHYS.ORG (Apr. 18, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-04-google-chief-privacy.html (“We 
have made a tremendous effort to focus and double-down on privacy issues.”). 
 151. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 85. 
 152. See Frederic Lardinois, Google’s Director of Privacy Alma Whitten Steps Down, 
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Lawrence You, an experienced Google hand with a doctorate in 
computer science from the University of California at Santa Cruz 
and an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering from 
Stanford.153 Both technologists became privacy leads from a cyber 
security background, which makes sense given that some 
technologists conflate privacy and security.154 
Several former Google employees interviewed noted that the 
team was almost entirely focused on security and generally 
isolated from any engineering work and product design. For 
example, a job posting for an engineer for Google’s privacy “red 
team” conflated privacy and security: 
As a Data Privacy Engineer at Google you will help ensure 
that our products are designed to the highest standards and 
are operated in a manner that protects the privacy of our 
users. Specifically, you will work as member of our Privacy 
Red Team to independently identify, research, and help 
resolve potential privacy risks across all of our products, 
services, and business processes in place today.155 
One interviewee said that these jobs were akin to “penetration 
testing, which is like hiring a hacker to test your security.”156 
Beyond developing cyber security structures, Google’s privacy 
team often operated like a separate corporate department that had 
to clear products at the end of the design process even though 
privacy representatives were supposed to be integrated into design 
teams. As one former engineer put it, “we would need to run our 
design by privacy, legal, and marketing.”157 But three factors 
prevented that process from having any real impact on consumer 
privacy in design. First, the team was entirely “focused on 
security. They wanted to know if what I did could be hacked. And 
I told them no.” Second, the process was “compliance-style. I 
remember being told by my manager that ‘privacy checked the 
boxes, so we can go ahead.’”158 And third, there was a sense among 
three interviewees that even though the privacy team, like the 
                                                     
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 1, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/04/01/googles-director-of-
privacy-alma-whitten-steps-down/. 
 153. See Lawrence You, Google+ Profile, https://plus.google.com/115317725503531115879 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 154. See supra notes 122–128 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Thomas Claburn, Google ‘Red Team’ To Test Product Privacy, 
INFORMATIONWEEK: DARKREADING (Aug. 23, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/ 
risk-management/google-red-team-to-test-product-privacy/d/d-id/1105950?.  
 156. Telephone interview with former Google employee (Apr. 18, 2016) (notes on file 
with Author). 
 157. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124. 
 158. Google employee interview, supra note 156. 
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legal and marketing departments, were seen as hindrances to 
design, the team did not really want to get in the way. “Nobody at 
Google wants to stop creativity,” one former engineer said.159 “I 
can’t say for sure, but I’m sure privacy didn’t want to, either. They 
didn’t stop us from doing our work.”160 This narrow, compliance 
focus from a team that, some suggested, wanted to get out of the 
way of the design process, is quite different from the more robust, 
deeply embedded vision that emerged from Bamberger and 
Mulligan’s interviews. More specifically, it appears that the 
structures the CPOs tried to put in place were insufficient. 
Given the breakdown in operationalizing privacy through 
dedicated corporate structure, either because such structures did 
not exist or because of their narrow focus on security, privacy 
decision-making fell to the engineers themselves. Any “decision we 
ever had to make about privacy, when it did come up, was made 
according to our best intuition,” one engineer noted.161 And these 
engineers rarely, if ever, could turn to a privacy expert or even a 
lawyer for advice. Rather, as many technologists reported in their 
interviews, they do their work in teams, many of which included 
only other designers, an artist and, perhaps, a business-oriented 
liaison. The team leader was also a coder; his—and they are almost 
all men162—supervisor was also a coder, promoted because he was 
particularly good at his job, not because he had any leadership 
skills or strategic planning perspective. Plus, many engineers 
repeatedly noted the high degree of turnover within their teams.163 
In this environment, privacy decisions were made ad hoc, without 
any clear guidance, and by technologists not necessarily in the best 
position to make them. 
3. The Role of the User.  Users played an outsized role in the 
narrative teased out by Bamberger and Mulligan. To the CPOs 
interviewed, the user was at the center of their flexible and 
adaptive approach to privacy. The model let “customer 
or . . . individual expectations” guide corporate behavior above and 
beyond the limited requirements of the law of notice-and-choice.164 
                                                     
 159. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124. 
 160. Google employee interview, supra note 156. 
 161. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company (6) 
(June 20, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 162. See e.g., Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-
white-guy-problem.html (discussing the existence and effects of implicit bias in future 
technology design given that most technology designers are white men). 
 163. Interview with Silicon Valley engineer (6), supra note 161. 
 164. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 270. 
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As noted above, CPOs saw themselves as “steward[s]” of their 
customers’ data, and focused their work on earning and 
maintaining user trust: “[T]he end objective,” one CPO reported, 
“is always what’s the right thing to do to maintain the company’s 
trusted relationship with our employees, with our clients, with any 
constituency in society that has a relationship to us.”165 
This fiduciary, trust-based approach to privacy is the gold 
standard for users. If implemented, it would change users’ 
traditionally limited role in the design of new technologies, from 
one in which users rarely factor into and yet are constrained by 
design166 to one in which users become part of the design 
process.167 However, as my interviews revealed, how real people 
use the products that technologists create is less important than 
legal or professional mandates that govern design.168 
Fifteen of the designers I interviewed noted it was difficult in 
practice to consider user needs. As one engineer noted, “there was 
always an idea that we were designing for customers, many of 
them loyal to [the company], but it’s difficult to consider that in 
any practical way as I was actually doing my work.”169 An 
experienced engineer who became a senior product manager in 
Silicon Valley summed up six interviewees’ thoughts on how users 
factored into their work: “[The company] really cared about 
customers trusting us. But that wasn’t my job. My job was to make 
unhackable infrastructure, to design a platform that worked and 
                                                     
 165. Id. at 271. 
 166. See Woolgar, supra note 16 (ethnographic study of a company developing one of the 
first microcomputers showing that structural forces at play prevented users from truly being 
considered in design). See also LUCY A. SUCHMAN, HUMAN-MACHINE RECONFIGURATION 186–
93, 257–84 (2d ed. 2007) (users configured by design); Cohen, supra note 38, at 210, 221, 225, 
233–36 (the design of built online environments constrains user behavior). 
 167. As several sociologists have argued, users can be part of the social construction of 
new technologies. See, e.g., Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, Users as Agents of Technological 
Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States, 37 TECH. & 
CUL. 763, 768–94 (1996) (cars); CLAUDE S. FISHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
THE TELEPHONE TO 1940 82 (1992) (telephone). But in these narratives, users factor into the 
post-design social process by which inventions situate themselves into society. Integrating 
robust privacy norms into the companies that create new technologies would ensure that users 
and user needs are considered every step of the way during the design process. 
 168. The notion that technology and related law and policy should consider the 
embodied experience of real users was raised, most notably, by Larry Lessig, Julie Cohen, 
and others. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 24–29 
(1999) (the design of the digital technologies that make up “cyberspace” make it impossible 
for it to be a completely free space); CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF supra note 37, at 
24–31 (2012). See also MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, xi 
(Ted Honderich ed., Colin Smith trans. 1962). 
 169. Telephone interview with engineer at Silicon Valley technology company (2) 
(June 24, 2016) (notes on file with Author) 
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worked well.”170 Some technologists went further. One said: 
“There is no possible way I could factor users into design. How 
would that even be possible? There is no single user.”171 Four 
interviewees voiced the same problem. Their response was to 
“design for the only person I know: myself” or to “design based on 
the higher ups’ message.”172  
There was another recurring theme: in seven interviews, 
technologists recalled that the concepts of the user and user trust 
did come up, but most often with respect to the company’s bottom 
line. The former Google and Microsoft engineer said it best. After 
recalling the 2010 Chinese hack of Google servers173 and the 2011 
FTC action against Google for misleading customers about the 
privacy implications of Google Buzz,174 it became clear that “Google 
was concerned about users, but only as it affected the bottom line.” 
He continued: 
We were told, ‘Don’t let [the China hack or the Google Buzz 
action] happen again.’ The company’s perspective was: we want 
to protect our customers so they feel comfortable sharing their 
data so we can still sell them adds. If Google has a major breach, 
Google is done.175 
 This perspective seems in line with many companies’ and 
technologists’ focus on security as the sum total of their privacy 
priorities. But it reduces the impact users can have on the design 
process. 
Users factored only nominally into the privacy work of lawyers 
at private firms, as well. In the last ten years, at least 90 of the 
AmLaw Top 100 law firms have created privacy and security 
practices.176 Their attorneys’ work is varied, ranging from complex 
                                                     
 170. Telephone interview with senior product manager (Oct. 4, 2016) (notes on file 
with Author). 
 171. This problem was echoed by several of the engineers interviewed by Steve 
Woolgar for Configuring the User. See Woolgar, supra note 16. 
 172. Telephone interview with game platform designer (Aug. 15, 2016) (notes on file 
with Author). 
 173. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers Who Breached Google Gained Access 




 174. Complaint, In the Matter of Google, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 102 3136, Docket No. C-
4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf. 
 175. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124.  
 176. Ninety of the AmLaw Top 100 law firms included specific reference to their firm’s 
privacy practices, alternatively called “Privacy and Cybersecurity,” “Security and Privacy,” 
“Data Security,” or some variation. Because attorneys at the few top law firms that did not 
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litigation to ongoing risk counseling. They also draft and update their 
clients’ privacy policies, which, ostensibly, are supposed to give users 
notice of platforms’ data use practices.177 Most attorneys follow the 
same procedure when updating privacy policies: after researching 
relevant federal and state laws, FTC settlements, and any other 
applicable guidance, they meet with in-house counsel and discuss 
data use practices in more detail. Few would speak to their clients’ 
engineering team leaders to learn precisely how the company uses 
customer data; most rely on in-house counsel or the company’s chief 
technology officer to obtain the information for them. They would 
then take this information and determine if updates to privacy 
notices were necessary. Although some might argue that in-house 
counsel is supposed to play this intermediary role, their involvement 
in the process creates friction between engineers and privacy policies 
that can end up weakening notice.  
Although all attorneys interviewed recognized that privacy 
policies “provided notice to users” and some encouraged their clients 
to keep policies “short” and “comprehensible,”178 the vast majority of 
their work focused on privacy policy content. Most of the attorneys 
were not concerned that privacy policies have become long, legalese 
documents that users cannot understand.179 As one attorney told me 
directly: privacy policies “are legal documents and we treat them as 
such.”180 Another admitted that she “write[s] privacy policies for the 
FTC. They are the only people who read them.”181 When probed 
further, the head of a top law firm’s privacy practice stated that 
“users know exactly where they are. If they wanted to read privacy 
policies, they know where to find them. But they don’t. The FTC does, 
and they are the ones who determine if our clients are at risk.”182 
This last point reflected a common theme in most of the 
attorneys’ responses. They saw their job as primarily “protect[ing] 
clients from litigation” from the FTC and state attorneys general. 
User expectations were absent. As one attorney with ten years’ 
                                                     
differentiate a privacy-specific practice may still work on privacy issues on a more informal 
basis, it is more accurate to say “at least 90” rather than 90. 
 177. See supra Part II.A.  
 178. Telephone interview with partner at 5-person privacy/internet boutique law firm 
(Mar. 26, 2016) (notes on file with Author).  
 179. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 91, at 72 (presenting results of experiment 
showing average internet users do not understand privacy policies). 
 180. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (1) (Sept. 16, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author).  
 181. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (2) (July 8, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 182. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (4) (July 15, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
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experience as outside privacy counsel noted, “When it comes to 
privacy policies, we look to the law and we make sure we disclose 
everything we need do.” Like their narrow, notice-based conception 
of privacy,183 firm attorneys’ take on their limited responsibilities 
with respect to privacy policies contrasts with the robust “company 
law” created by the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground. In the latter, 
privacy leads not only found the law on the books unhelpful, they 
went far beyond the letter of the law to develop robust privacy 
structures throughout their companies.184 Outside counsel, however, 
relied almost exclusively on the law on the books to inform their 
work. The kind of creativity displayed by the CPOs interviewed by 
Bamberger and Mulligan was absent. 
4. Technologists, Lawyers, and Privacy Professionals.  The 
CPOs Bamberger and Mulligan interviewed alluded to extensive 
interaction down the corporate hierarchy between full- or part-time 
privacy professionals and other decision-making employees. CPOs 
and their direct subordinates would often work with business-line 
executives, in-house counsel, risk management teams and other 
functional groups to both internal privacy infrastructures. This 
teamwork was important, the CPOs agreed, because privacy needed 
a “buy-in” from key stakeholders across the company.185 Some of 
these companies also embedded privacy professionals within 
business units, with each having subject matter and privacy 
expertise, so they could interact with the businesses more directly 
and provide decision-making guidance and training on the ground.186 
Therefore, some CPOs deployed privacy officers across departments, 
from marketing and sales to finance and operations, that reported 
directly to their unit executives and to the CPO.187 The interviewees 
agreed that this diffuse structure was critical to “positioning privacy 
as a design requirement rather than a legal matter.”188 
Ostensibly, the goal of this embedded network of privacy 
employees is to keep privacy decision-making as close as possible to 
the trenches of day-to-day work. That requires ongoing interaction 
and cooperation among privacy professionals and business unit 
workers. At least with respect to the designers I interviewed, 
however, that cooperation did not always exist. Several engineers 
recalled “never once” meeting with “a privacy person the entire time 
                                                     
 183. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 184. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 185. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 83. 
 186. Id. at 84.  
 187. Id. at 85. 
 188. Id. at 86. 
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[they were] there.”189 Another acknowledged that “there was a person 
or a team who was supposed to be our privacy and security contact, 
but I never heard from him.”190 A senior technologist in Silicon Valley 
recalled that he “made all the decisions when they came up. I’m sure 
there was someone, on paper, that I was supposed to talk to, but no 
one ever said anything, no one made a push for it, and it just never 
came up.”191 Lawyers, too, were alien to technologists. “If you hadn’t 
mentioned that there were lawyers there, or if I didn’t know 
independently, I could easily assume that [the company] employed 
zero attorneys,” said one engineer.192 Outside counsel, one 
interviewee noted flatly, “doesn’t have the ability to [talk to] 
engineers.”193 This lack of interaction is not necessarily a meaningful 
thing; one interviewee suggested that “having to take a meeting with 
a lawyer was a bad thing because it probably meant you did 
something wrong.”194 
But the interviews suggested that the lack of interaction 
between the technology teams, on the one hand, and everyone else, 
on the other, was a pattern. As noted above, many technologists at 
these companies work in teams that consist primarily of other 
engineers. The teams are also run by engineers, and the tech lead’s 
supervisor is also an engineer. “It was very easy,” one former 
employee at Facebook noted, “for me to go an entire year without 
talking to anyone who wasn’t also an engineer or computer 
programmer.”195 A product manager who started as a coder for a 
large technology company said that although “I didn’t realize this 
when I started, but I’ve found it to be true and was probably true of 
me: programmers don’t want to be bothered by other people at their 
job.”196 An engineer who has been through several job transitions in 
Silicon Valley and elsewhere also noted that independence is part of 
how these jobs are marketed to computer science graduates. As she 
explained, “They will give you money, food, and ping pong tables, you 
know what I mean, but the most important thing, at least to me, they 
tell you is that you will be independent. You will have time to be 
                                                     
 189. Silicon Valley engineer (4) interview, supra note 107. 
 190. Interview with former programmer at New York start-up, New York, NY (June 
24, 2016) (notes on file with Author).  
 191. Telephone interview with senior Silicon Valley engineer (Oct. 8, 2016) (notes on 
file with Author).  
 192. Google and Microsoft engineer interview, supra note 124. 
 193. Former general counsel at New York technology company interview, supra note 139. 
 194. Interview with web designer, supra note 145. 
 195. Telephone interview with former Facebook employee (Oct. 12, 2016) (notes on file 
with Author).  
 196. Telephone interview with former coder at large technology company (Sept. 12, 
2016) (notes on file with Author). 
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creative, and you will solve these awesome engineering problems, 
and we’re not going to get in your way.”197 This resonates with what 
we know about leading technology companies like Google. The 
company is famous for a nonhierarchical structure,198 independent 
engineering teams, and the so-called “Google 20% time,” or the 
promise that technologists can set aside 20% of their time to work on 
their own creative projects.199 It makes sense, then, that 
technologists might just not interact with lawyers and privacy 
professionals, but also remain separated from other types of 
employees, as well. 
This lack of interaction has effects on the design process. During 
my talks with attorneys, many of them ably recognized even subtle 
privacy issues associated with new technologies, particularly their 
retail clients’ strategy to link loyalty programs with facial and 
biometric tracking. But when asked how they advise their clients 
about their privacy obligations, they took a passive role. “Unless 
someone raises the issue to me, there’s nothing I can do,” noted a 
partner with several years of privacy counseling experience.200 
In-house lawyers who are naturally closer to the design process than 
outside counsel admitted this, as well. “We would let them come to 
us,” several attorneys employed by technology companies said. 
Although the attorney’s “door was always open, and I’m there to 
help,” many in-house attorneys tasked with advising design teams 
waited for the designers themselves to take the first step.201 But if 
the technologists are not equipped to do so, then privacy issues never 
get to a privacy professional’s desk. Another attorney stated, “It’s not 
my job to challenge the design process. My job is to make sure what 
they tell me they’re doing is compliant with the law.” And outside 
                                                     
 197. Telephone interview with former engineer at Silicon Valley technology company 
(1) (May 30, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 198. See, e.g., DOUGLAS EDWARDS, I’M FEELING LUCKY: THE CONFESSIONS OF GOOGLE 
EMPLOYEE NUMBER 59, 224–27 (2011) (discussing the early years of Google including a 
now-famous firing of all project managers in 2001); STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW 
GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 158–60 (2011) (covering the origins of the 
nonhierarchical structure and its effects on creativity and innovation). 
 199. See LASZLO BOCK, WORK RULES!: INSIGHTS FROM INSIDE GOOGLE THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW YOU LIVE AND LEAD 135–36 (2015). Notably, the “20 percent time” may 
be mostly imaginary. But, as Bock explains in his book, the “idea” of the 20 percent time is 
more important than its actual existence or use. “It operates somewhat outside the lines of 
formal management oversight, and always will, because the most talented and creative 
people can’t be forced to work.” Id. at 136. See also Nicholas Carlson, The ‘Dirty Little Secret’ 
About Google’s 20% Time, According To Marissa Mayer, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mayer-google-20-time-does-not-exist-2015-1.  
 200. Interview with senior associate at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (2) (July 29, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 201. Interview with in-house attorney at major technology company (Aug. 8, 2017) 
(notes on file with Author). 
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lawyers rarely talk to engineers to get that information. That same 
attorney noted that he spends most of his time “talking to the CPO 
and the general counsel. No one wants me talking to an engineer. I 
need the CPO filter to translate what the engineer does into language 
I can understand.”202 
5. Implications.  These interviews allude to a narrative 
running in parallel to that of the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground. 
Although not all technologists and lawyers think about and 
operationalize privacy in the same way, this research suggests that 
the narrative describe in Privacy on the Ground may not yet be fully 
realized. Rather, at some companies, a narrow understanding of 
privacy may be factoring into the design on the ground. That may 
help explain the privacy gaps in platforms like Snapchat and 
Pokémon Go. In addition, the very existence of this trend has several 
implications for privacy law and privacy’s place in society. I will touch 
on four related points here, focusing on the impact on theory, law, 
organizations, and individuals. 
First, although some scholars rightly argue that privacy means 
different things in different contexts, thus making a single definition 
of privacy hard to pin down, the concept’s continued ambiguity is 
having real effects on the ground. Daniel Solove, for example, has 
argued that reducing privacy to a single common denominator misses 
important aspects of privacy that are relevant in some contexts and 
not others.203 Therefore, we should recognize that different invasions 
of privacy implicate a series of privacy values, sometimes overlapping 
and sometimes distinct.204 More recently, Helen Nissenbaum further 
developed this point. Like Solove, who argued that privacy was a part 
of social practice, Nissenbaum noted that the propriety of revelation 
of someone else’s information varies with context. Because different 
social interactions are governed by evolving norms informed by law, 
history, and culture, our expectations as to what should happen to 
our information varies by context, as well.205 
These theories of privacy aptly capture a decidedly contextual 
phenomenon, but they leave privacy open to attack as ambiguous. 
And ambiguous concepts are hard to administer in the courts and on 
the ground. When it comes to the law on the books, the lack of strong, 
                                                     
 202. Interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (2) (Aug. 19, 2016) (notes on 
file with Author). 
 203. See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 17, at 1092, 1127–29. 
 204. See id. at 1145–47; SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 117, at 8–11, 
171–98. 
 205. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43, at 134–35; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138 (2004). 
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well-defined privacy norms allows competing rights, like free speech, 
take precedence.206 And by leaving a vacuum that notice-and-choice 
has seemed to fill, robust conceptions of privacy have generally failed 
to benefit from law’s powerful expressive capacity.207 When it comes 
to privacy on the ground, privacy’s complexity hypnotizes 
technologists and lawyers. To many, privacy is too complex, 
“amorphous,”208 and “subjective.”209 As such, it is difficult to integrate 
into product design. One of two simpler concepts—notice or 
security—fills the void: it is harder for a company to wrestle with 
evolving notions of consumer privacy than it is to draft a privacy 
policy, add encryption on the back end of a product, and claim its 
privacy responsibilities are complete. This suggests that privacy 
scholarship must take into account administrability, not just with 
respect to judges assessing privacy claims, all of whom have the 
benefit of deliberation,210 but also with respect to privacy 
professionals, designers, and lawyers who need a relatively simple 
way of understanding the value and purpose of integrating user 
expectations about privacy into design. 
A second, but related implication of this research is that the 
conflation of privacy and encryption appears to be crowding out 
lawyers’ and privacy professionals’ focus on consumer privacy. The 
legal community has been combining privacy and cyber security for 
some time; law firm privacy practices are often “privacy and cyber 
security” practices.211 They may have learned this from the 
                                                     
 206. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001); Michael Froomkin, CCR 
Symposium: The Right to Remain Anonymous Matters, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 14, 
2009), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/ccr_symposium_t_1.html. But 
see Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1149, 154–55 (2005) (discussing and then critiquing the conventional discourse 
suggesting free speech and privacy conflict). See also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1408–09 (2000) 
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 208. Senior engineer at Uber interview, supra note 114. 
 209. Telephone interview with attorney at AmLaw Top 100 firm (6) (Oct. 6, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). See also Glenn Chapman, New Google Security Chief Looks for 
Balance with Privacy, PHYS.ORG (Apr. 18, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-04-google-chief-
privacy.html.  
 210. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 110, at 78 (discussing the need 
to articulate the value of privacy so judges and policymakers can effectively weight it 
against countervailing interests). 
 211. See, e.g., Privacy and Cybersecurity, PROSKAUER, http://www.proskauer.com/ 
practices/privacy-cybersecurity/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018); Litigation: Cybersecurity and 
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companies they represent. At Google, for example, privacy and 
security are blended together.212 At Bloomberg LP, privacy and data 
security are grouped together under “risk and compliance,”213 which 
reflects the view of the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s study that 
privacy is about “managing risk.”214 Industry trade conferences do 
the same.215 Even state governments address the issues together.216 
But privacy and cyber security are not the same. Privacy is, at 
its core, about the social relationships governing disclosure between 
and among individuals and between users and the platforms that 
collect, analyze, and manipulate their information for some purpose 
(often for profit).217 That is, ostensibly, why so many CPOs say they 
think about privacy in terms of trust.218 Cyber security is far more 
about preventing, assessing, and addressing attacks on data safety 
and integrity. President Obama’s Cyberspace Policy Review, for 
example, defined cyber security as “strategy . . . regarding the 
security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full 
range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, 
international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and 
recovery policies and activities . . . as they relate to the security and 
stability of the global information and communications 
infrastructure.”219 Legal scholars have offered similar definitions, 
focused on “criminality” and “espionage”220 or “using computer 
                                                     
Data Protection, PAUL WEISS, https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/cybersecurity- 
data-protection.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2018)). 
 212. See supra notes 149–160 and accompanying text. 
 213. Paul Wood, Chief Risk and Compliance Officer at Bloomberg LP, oversees data 
security and privacy. Dan Doctoroff, Our New Chief Risk & Compliance Officer, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/our-
new-chief-risk-compliance-officer/. 
 214. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 68. 
 215. See, e.g., PRIVACY+SECURITY FORUM, https://privacyandsecurityforum.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2018) (“The Privacy + Security Forum breaks down the silos of privacy and 
security by bringing together seasoned thought leaders.”). 
 216. See, e.g., Washington State Announces Federal Cybersecurity Partnership, Office 
of Privacy and Data Protection, GOVTECH. (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/ 
security/Washington-State-Announces-Federal-Cybersecurity-Partnership-Office-of-
Privacy-and-Data-Protection.html.  
 217. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43, at 71, 196; Waldman, supra note 18, at 561, 590–
601 (privacy is a social concept about how we relate to and share with others and the rest 
of society).  
 218. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. The connection between privacy 
and trust is a hot topic, of late. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 92, at 196–97; Richards & 
Hartzog, supra note 18, at 447 (protecting privacy can build trust between online platforms 
and consumers). 
 219. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A 
TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2010), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final_0.pdf.  
 220. Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding the 
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technology to engage in activity that undermines a society’s ability to 
maintain internal or external order.”221 Conflating the two often 
means that consumer privacy gets short shrift. Technology 
companies understand that a lack of cyber security is a threat to the 
bottom line,222 and they drill that concern into their engineers. As 
several of them explained, the full breadth of their privacy-related 
work was to prevent their products from getting hacked. The 
non-security aspects of data privacy and consumer expectations 
were, at best, secondary. 
Third, these interviews reveal the potential for technologists’ 
ongoing resistance to input from others within the same 
organization. Although some senior engineers noted that, upon 
reflection, they would have welcomed input from privacy 
professionals,223 many technologists pushed back on working with 
lawyers on design. Several noted that they “are the experts here.”224 
Several junior and senior engineers felt that “lawyers do not belong 
in design”225 beyond “telling us what to do so we don’t go to jail.”226 
One engineer noted that “the more other people, whether they be 
lawyers or marketing people or a budget guy, are at every step along 
the way during the design process, the more it’s going to get off the 
rails, and then my team is going to get blamed for not meeting our 
goals.”227 This is a common struggle in large organizations. As 
Renato Orsato, a sustainability scholar, has argued, employee 
resistance to input and change can create an “arena in which an 
indeterminate struggle unfolds,”228 hampering innovation and 
productivity.229 Resolving this tension undoubtedly requires more 
than top-down input from a CPO or general counsel. Rather, it 
demands building in organizational learning into the network 
structure of the corporation. 
                                                     
Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 233, 235–36 (2010). 
 221. Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to 
Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 381 (2007). For a 
comprehensive summary of these and other definitions of cybersecurity, as well as a cogent 
critique of the conventional wisdom, please see Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. 
L. REV. 584, 591–95 (2011). 
 222. Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Books, supra note 1, at 276. 
 223. See, e.g., Engineer at large sharing economy company interview, supra note 143. 
 224. Silicon Valley engineer (4) interview, supra note 107. 
 225. Google employee interview, supra note 156. 
 226. Interview with web designer, supra note 145.  
 227. Senior product manager interview, supra note 170.  
 228. Renato J. Orsato, Frank den Hond, & Stewart Clegg, The Political Ecology of 
Automobile Recycling in Europe, 23 ORG. STUD. 639, 654 (2002). 
 229. See Dean Bartlett, Embedding Corporate Responsibility: The Development of a 
Transformational Model of Organizational Innovation, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 409, 414 
(2009). 
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Finally, the interviews with technologists paint a picture of 
isolated design teams, staffed almost entirely by engineers, making 
privacy decisions on the fly. In addition to this being an 
organizational concern,230 it also exacerbates technology’s bias 
problem. Designers, most of whom are men,231 either consciously 
design for themselves or subconsciously design with all the implicit 
biases that come with them.232 Like artificial intelligence systems 
that develop biases by learning from limited inputs,233 technology 
product designers translate their own biases into the devices they 
create: products may fit in men’s front pockets, but not women’s; 
mobile assistants understand voice commands like “I’m having a 
heart attack,” a health crisis plaguing mostly men, but not “I’ve been 
raped,” a trauma more likely to befall a woman;234 apps may offer 
benefits to those who permit constant, real time location tagging, but 
they miss the fact that continuous tracking makes cyberstalking 
easier;235 dating tools may allow users to select “male” or “female” but 
not “queer”;236 and engineers may design online gaming platforms to 
satisfy 12–18 year-old boys, but neglect to program in safeguards 
that prevent, identify, and punish harassment,237 most of which is 
                                                     
 230. See infra Part IV.C. 
 231. Women remain a distinct minority among science and technology graduates 
employed in inventor roles at large corporations. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., WOMEN, 
MINORITIES, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Tbl. 5.1 (2015) 
(2012 statistics show that women receive bachelor’s degrees in certain science fields at far 
lower rates than men, including computer sciences (18.2%), engineering (19.2%), physics 
(19.1%), and mathematics and statistics (43.1%)); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 35–36 (2014) (39% of chemists and 
material scientists are women; 27.9% of environmental scientists and geoscientists are 
women; 15.6% of chemical engineers are women; 12.1% of civil engineers are women; 8.3% of 
electrical and electronics engineers are women; 17.2% of industrial engineers are women; and 
7.2% of mechanical engineers are women). 
 232. See Crawford, supra note 162. 
 233. See Jeff Larson, Julia Angwin, & Terry Parris, Jr., How Machines Learn to be Racist, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/breaking-the-black-box-how-
machines-learn-to-be-racist?word=cat.  
 234. Adam S. Miner et al., Smartphone-Based Conversational Agents and Responses to 
Questions About Mental Health, Interpersonal Violence, and Physical Health, 176 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 619, 621–22 (2016). 
 235. See Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used To Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse 
Victims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/ 
2014/09/15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims.  
 236. See Rena Bivens & Oliver L. Haimson, Baking Gender Into Social Media Design: How 
Platforms Shape Categories for Users and Advertisers, 2016 SOCIAL MEDIA + SOCIETY 1, 3–7 
(2016); Rena Bivens, The Gender Binary Will Not Be Deprogrammed: Ten Years of Coding 
Gender on Facebook, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1–2 (2015). 
 237. See Keith Stewart, Brianna Wu and the Human Cost of Gamergate: ‘Every Woman I 
Know in the Industry is Scared’, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2014/oct/17/brianna-wu-gamergate-human-cost.  
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based on gender.238 These design omissions may not be purposeful or 
malicious; rather, they stem from designers’ failure to appreciate the 
distinct needs of marginalized populations not often represented in 
the design process. The narrative described in this Article suggests 
that the demographics of technology design teams within the 
corporate organization may contribute to and metastasize the 
discriminatory effects of implicit bias in design. Therefore, 
embedding a robust, user-focused conception of privacy into the 
design of technology products would not just align data collection 
with user expectations. It would also have salutary effects on social 
norms and social equality. 
IV. EMBEDDING ROBUST PRIVACY NORMS INTO DESIGN 
Bamberger and Mulligan began a research agenda about 
how technology companies are approaching consumer privacy. I 
sought to determine if the narrative they found had been fully 
realized. Relying on a series of interviews with technologists 
and lawyers, this Article has so far shown that the robust 
“company law” of privacy envisioned by the CPOs in Privacy on 
the Ground may not yet have trickled down to those designing 
technology products. At least among those interviewed, privacy 
was either limited to notice or crowded out by cyber security. 
And corporate privacy structures either encouraged the 
minimization of privacy or stayed out of the fray all together. 
The top-down approach, fueled by industry self-regulation, may 
not be working. Although I do not mean to suggest that every 
view of every technology product designer is reflected in these 
interviews, this research raises the question of whether more 
needs to be done to get engineers on board with privacy as part 
of the design process. 
Historical evidence and sociological studies of corporate 
organizations suggest that embedding robust norms about 
consumer demands that go beyond mere compliance with legal 
requirements requires facilitating organizational learning. 
That is, both organizational structures and the people that work 
in them must adapt. They can do this through a multilevel 
comprehensive approach that addresses all barriers to norm 
diffusion, both within the corporation and in the social context 
in which it operates. This approach, illustrated in Figure 1, 
recognizes that organizational norms are the products of four 
                                                     
 238. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 13–17 (2014) 
(cyberharassment is often a gendered and sexualized phenomenon plaguing mostly women). 
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outstanding influences.239 Situated within a socio-legal context, 
corporations are influenced by (1) scholarship and media 
narratives conceptualizing their obligations, and (2) the web of 
laws, court decisions, rules, and real and threatened litigations 
that constitute the regulatory environment in which they, and 
their competitors, exist.240 As a collection of individuals working 
toward the same goal,241 corporations are also influenced by 
endogenous factors, including (3) the corporate structure that 
sets the frame for business routines and practice, and (4) the 
embodied experiences of the real people doing the real work in 
the company’s name.242 Of course, many of these influences 
overlap, but each works together to embed norms throughout 
the corporation. The balance of this Article approaches the 
problem of integrating privacy norms into design through this 
four-tiered lens. In each section, the Article shows how the 
current lack of embedded privacy norms can be partially 
explained by gaps at each level. Then, using historical examples 
of organizations adapting to meet changing legal and consumer 
expectations, as well as research into organizational learning, I 
suggest changes at each level that can help spread strong beliefs 
in consumer privacy among designers on the ground. 
                                                     
 239. This framework is adapted from work by Ruth Aguilera, a sociologist of business 
and organizations, to understand why businesses engage in corporate social responsibility 
programs that are not necessarily profit-oriented. See Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the 
S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in 
Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 836–37 (2007). Although there are differences 
between encouraging technology companies to embed privacy into design and, say, pushing 
companies to engage in socially beneficial initiatives, both require changes in 
organizational norms away from a strict, profit-only perspective. Therefore, organizational 
learning is important in both scenarios. 
 240. That other corporations in the same industry are similarly regulated 
characterizes the context in which a given corporation responds to regulatory or social 
demands. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 149. 
 241. See Andrew C. Inkpen & Eric W. K. Tsang, Social Capital, Networks, and 
Knowledge Transfer, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 146, 148 (2005) (corporations are vertical, 
structured networks of people operating under a unified corporate identity). 
 242. “Embodied” experience, or the idea that humans cannot divorce mental cognition 
from physical life, emphasizes the practical, behavioral experiences of real people 
interacting in contextual social situations. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN 
THOUGHT 19, 21–22 (1999); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF 
MERLEAU-PONTY 47–80, 138–81 (Alden L. Fisher ed., 1969); MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 207 (Colin Smith trans., 1962). In this context, this 
means that engineers do not exist in vacuums: they approach the world and do their work 
as fully realized embodied individuals, with unique backgrounds and biases. 
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A. Conceptualizing Privacy for Design 
Theory can offer professionals on the ground a solid 
intellectual foundation for understanding their work and its role 
in society at large.243 It can also drive the media narrative that 
shapes consumer expectations. The CPOs that spoke with 
Bamberger and Mulligan recognized this implicitly when they 
discussed the importance of conceptualizing privacy in such a way 
as to allow them to influence corporate priorities.244 To these 
CPOs, privacy was a constantly evolving notion bound up with 
user expectations and the trust between users and the company. 
The outside lawyers and technologists I interviewed, however, 
understood privacy far more narrowly, as either limited to notice 
or synonymous with data security. To bring the latter more in line 
with the former requires scholars to recognize the doctrinal 
connection between privacy and trust. 
                                                     
 243. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 110, at 78. 
 244. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 1, at 59–68.  
Figure 1: 













* U.S. federal law and state laws with national implications. 
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Traditional privacy scholarship, much of which has focused on 
the right of individuals to maintain their autonomy, control over 
information, and separation from the prying eyes of government 
and society, does not do that.245 It should come as little surprise, 
then, that the law on the books246 and practitioners on the 
ground247 see privacy through an autonomy lens, as well. But in a 
world where sharing data is often a necessary prerequisite for 
online interaction and where powerful internet companies collect, 
use, and analyze massive amounts of information in ongoing 
interactions with their users, concepts like control and autonomy 
are inadequate. They fail to appreciate the relational aspects of 
data flows.248 More specifically, as I have argued elsewhere, users 
hand over personal information to online platforms in contexts 
characterized by trust, vulnerability, and an asymmetry of 
power.249 Therefore, building on Dan Solove’s and Helen 
Nissenbaum’s work on the contextual, relational aspects of 
privacy, I argue that, like the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground 
suggested, privacy should be understood as a social concept based 
on relationships of trust. 
Trust is a resource of social capital between or among two or 
more parties concerning the expectations that others will behave 
according to accepted norms.250 It is the “favorable expectation 
regarding other people’s actions and intentions,”251 or the belief 
that others will behave in a predictable manner. For example, if I 
ask a friend to hold my spare set of keys, I trust she will not break 
in and steal from me. When an individual speaks with relative 
strangers in a support group like Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), she 
                                                     
 245. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, whose Harvard Law Review article began 
the privacy discourse, understood privacy as a right “to be let alone.” Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). The seminal 
privacy law scholar Alan Westin took a similar autonomy-based approach, seeing privacy 
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” ALAN F. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). For comprehensive reviews of the autonomy roots of many 
traditional theories of privacy, see generally Cohen, supra note 206; Waldman, supra note 
18, at 565–88. 
 246. See supra Part II.A.  
 247. See supra Part III.B.2.  
 248. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 43.  
 249. See generally Waldman, supra note 18. 
 250. Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes 
on the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993). 
 251. Guido Möllering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of 
Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension, 35 SOC. 403, 404 (2001). See also Ken Newton 
and Sonja Zmerli, Three Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 169, 
171 (2011); J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as Social Reality, 63 SOCIAL FORCES 
967, 968 (1985).  
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trusts that they will not divulge her secrets.252 Trust, therefore, 
includes a willingness to accept some risk and vulnerability 
toward others and steps in to grease the wheels of social activity:253 
I cannot know for certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key 
privileges or that my fellow support group members will keep my 
confidences, so trust allows me to interact with and rely on them. 
And, breaches of those relationships—when neighbors break in or 
when AA members share outside the group—are breaches of trust. 
Information is exchanged with technology products and 
platforms on similar terms.254 We key in our credit card numbers, 
financial information, and sexual preferences with the expectation 
that commercial websites, online banks, and dating platforms will 
keep our confidences. When they do not, it is primarily our trust 
that has been violated, not our right to control information or keep 
secrets, both of which we ceded long before the breach.255 
Conceptualizing privacy this way would bring privacy theory 
in line with the views of the CPOs in Bamberger and Mulligan’s 
research. It would give them an intellectual foundation upon 
which to argue that protecting consumer privacy is an ongoing 
responsibility based on the relationship between sharers and data 
collectors rather than something to be crossed off a list of priorities 
after drafting a privacy notice. The latter is a direct reflection of 
autonomy-based privacy definitions. Privacy-as-trust, however, 
means making privacy protection an integral part of companies’ 
ongoing relationships with their consumers. 
B. Privacy Law as an Incentive to Act 
Several interviews alluded to the fact that gaps in U.S. law 
ensured that consumer privacy would remain a low priority. Even 
when privacy issues were raised, lawyers and executives relied on 
“the fairly low risk of an enforcement action from the FTC” as a 
rationale for not pushing engineers to change design.256 That must 
change. Understanding the connection between privacy and trust 
                                                     
 252. See Understanding Anonymity, https://www.aa.org/pages/en_US/understanding-
anonymity (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). 
 253. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 4 (1979). 
 254. As Jack Balkin notes, obligations exist between two parties not because of the 
content of those obligations, but because the relationship is enforceable through some legal 
tool, i.e., a contract or, in the data sharing context, Balkin argues, a fiduciary relationship. 
See Balkin, supra note 20, at 1205 n.104. 
 255. Dan Solove calls this problem the “secrecy paradigm,” where privacy rights are 
extinguished upon revelation on the theory that once a piece of information is shared with 
others, it can no longer be considered private. See SOLOVE, supra note 20, at 42–43, 143.  
 256. Former general counsel at New York technology company interview, supra note 139.  
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has several implications for privacy law that can help embed 
strong privacy norms into technology product design.257 
Expectations of trust form the basis for the law to treat some data 
collectors as fiduciaries of our information.258 In addition, a strong 
privacy tort regime could vindicate our rights and incentivize 
companies to take our privacy seriously. We have seen this work 
before. Citizen tort litigation pushed the automobile and 
pharmaceutical industries to embed consumer safety into car and 
drug designs. The same can now be done for privacy. In addition, 
many of the interviews I conducted with technologists that took 
their privacy obligations seriously worked at companies that had 
been on the receiving end of strong, disruptive regulatory 
interventions. This opens a path for the FTC to play an even more 
significant role in incentivizing companies to design consumer 
privacy protections into their products. 
Treating some data collectors as information fiduciaries, as 
Jack Balkin has suggested, would go far toward incentivizing 
companies to integrate privacy into design. Fiduciaries are those 
that have special obligations of loyalty to another.259 Those 
loyalties are based on trust: a trustor, client, or beneficiary hands 
over money, control, and information to another, who, in turn, has 
a duty not to betray that trust.260 Therefore, if we recognize that 
the exchange of personal information depends upon similar 
relationships of trust and confidence, many technology companies 
can be seen fiduciaries of our data.261 This is true for the same 
reasons money managers, estate trustees, and doctors are 
fiduciaries. First, our relationship with many online platforms is 
asymmetrical: Facebook and Amazon, for example, know a lot 
about us; we know very little about how their algorithms use our 
data.262 Second, we are completely dependent on these platforms 
for a variety of social, professional, commercial, informational, 
educational, and financial services. And we use them with the 
expectation that they will not misuse our data in the process. 
Third, many online platforms are experts at what they do: Google’s 
                                                     
 257. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 349 (1997) (discussing how law can influence norms). 
 258. See generally Balkin, supra note 20. 
 259. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011). 
 260. Id. at 4, 106–08.  
 261. Jack Balkin refers to these companies as “information fiduciaries.” Balkin, supra 
note 20, at 1209. See also Richards & Solove, supra note 21, at 156–58. 
 262. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1222. See also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) 
(discussing the “black box” of information algorithms). 
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search and OK Cupid’s matching algorithms are supposedly the 
best around, and they market themselves that way. Therefore, we 
hand over our information—from our search histories to intimate 
sexual desires—to these platforms in exchange for some benefit, 
trusting them to use our data in ways we expect.263 Given these 
similarities, it makes logical sense to treat such platforms as 
fiduciaries of our information and hold their feet to the fire when, 
if ever, they violate their duty of loyalty. 
Though sometimes overlapping with fiduciary law,264 tort law 
offers a parallel track for vindicating the privacy rights of victims 
of privacy-invasive design. To date, though, it has mostly failed in 
that regard: data breach and invasion of privacy victims rarely 
have standing to sue the companies that are supposed to keep 
their data private, so their cases are dismissed even when a 
company negligently caused a data breach.265 This allowed Google, 
for example, to avoid responsibility for violating a do-not-track 
promise because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate how tracking 
actually hurt them.266 And it has allowed companies that leave 
their databases open to hacks and other cyberattacks to avoid tort 
liability because, absent direct evidence that hackers used a 
plaintiff’s data to harm her financially, data breach claims are 
merely “allegations of hypothetical, future injury.”267 
These standing problems have neutered what should be an 
effective incentive for companies to act on privacy. We have seen 
tort law serve this function before. For example, when Americans 
first began driving cars, they did so in a regulatory void. There was 
also little social demand for corporate responsibility for 
automotive safety.268 Ralph Nader’s 1965 book, Unsafe at Any 
                                                     
 263. Balkin, supra note 20, at 1222. 
 264. See FRANKEL, supra note 259, at 240–41 (fiduciary duties and tort obligations 
have certain similarities, but should be considered distinct). 
 265. See, e.g., Dwyer v. American Express, 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1352–53 (Ill. App. 1995). 
After learning that American Express designed a system to track cardholder spending 
habits, aggregate that data, and create detailed user profiles for targeted advertising, 
several cardholders objected, arguing that the company intruded into their private 
information and appropriated it without their consent. The court disagreed on both counts. 
The information was not private, having already been handed over to American Express 
every time a card was used to make a purchase. Id. at 1354. And, in any event, cardholders 
never suffered any cognizable injury: customer tracking and profiling did not “deprive any 
of the cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.” Id. at 1356. 
 266. In re Google, Inc. Cookie Placement Privacy Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 442 (D. 
Del. 2013). 
 267. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 268. See MICHAEL R. LEMOV, CAR SAFETY WARS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND DEATH xiii (2015); MARTIN ALBAUM, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY 
SAFETY, SAFETY SELLS: MARKET FORCES AND REGULATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
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Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile, 
changed that. Outraged that Chevrolet both sold the Corvair 
knowing its dangers and refused to design in life saving tools,269 
the public pushed Congress to act270 and started bringing 
consumer safety lawsuits against carmakers. For fifty years before 
Unsafe at Any Speed, carmakers’ only obligation was to make cars 
“free from hidden defects.”271 That changed in 1968, when, via a 
negligence action against General Motors, a court imposed on 
automakers a duty of reasonable care to design cars that would 
“avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury” 
during a collision.272 Private tort litigation continued to vindicate 
consumer demands for safe automobiles273 and forced carmakers 
to improve fuel tank safety,274 protect drivers against side impact 
crashes,275 and design better seat belts,276 roofs,277 doors,278 and 
much more.279 Tort cases had similar effects on drug safety.280 
These cases pushed companies to integrate safety into design 
as a matter of course. It worked for three reasons. First, many of 
these cases resulted in significant settlement costs, incentivizing 
companies to take preventative action to avoid devastating, 
                                                     
AIRBAGS 1 (2005). 
 269. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 86 (1965).  
 270. See Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2002). Congress passed, and President Johnson signed, the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the Highway Safety Act in 1966. See id. at 1304. 
Highway safety regulation was tasked to the new National Highway Safety Bureau, later 
renamed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. See id. at 1305–06.  
 271. Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966). 
 272. Larson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 273. See, e.g., Dyson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (car 
companies must design “a reasonably safe container within which to make [a] journey”). 
 274. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). This 
case concerned the infamous Ford Pinto, which had a tendency to explode. 
 275. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 276. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Moran, 231 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2007, pet. 
granted, judgment vacated w.r.m.). 
 277. Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 710 N.W.2d 807 (Neb. 2006). 
 278. Seliner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2002-30454 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 2004). 
 279. See AM. ASSOC. FOR JUSTICE, DRIVEN TO SAFETY: HOW LITIGATION SPURRED AUTO 
SAFETY INNOVATIONS 4–9 (2010). 
 280. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925–27 (Cal. 1980) (“During the 
period defendants marketed DES, they knew or should have known that it was a 
carcinogenic substance, that there was a grave danger after varying periods of latency it 
would cause cancerous and precancerous growths in the daughters of the mothers who took 
it, and that it was ineffective to prevent miscarriage. Nevertheless, defendants continued 
to advertise and market the drug as a miscarriage preventative. They failed to test DES for 
efficacy and safety.”). 
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company-threatening damages.281 Second, private tort litigation 
supplemented overworked and underfunded regulatory 
structures. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
the federal agency tasked with developing rules for car and driver 
safety, is small, subject to budgetary and staffing limitations, and 
at risk of regulatory capture.282 As recently as 2014, its few staffers 
were responsible for dealing with up to 80,000 complaints per 
year.283 Legitimate complaints were missed. Tort litigants rushed 
in to fill the void. Third, the high-profile nature of tort lawsuits 
resulting in damage awards allowed these cases to have an 
expressive effect. By becoming part of the governing legal and 
media discourse about technology, industry, and corporate social 
responsibility, these cases helped solidify safety expectations 
among members of the public and forced even recalcitrant 
companies to act.284 
Today, consumers interested in protecting their privacy do not 
benefit from any of these factors. Data collectors rarely pay 
damages in privacy tort cases, leaving the understaffed FTC to 
protect consumer privacy on its own. And popular opinion on 
corporate privacy responsibility is, like the technologist’s vision of 
privacy, limited to data security. Data breaches that affected 
Target, Sony, and others receive significant press; the privacy 
issues associated with social networks, data aggregation, and 
black box and predictive algorithms do not. A robust tort regime 
can change that. As Dan Solove and Danielle Citron argue, courts 
should recognize the intangible, but no less damaging, harms 
associated with data breaches and invasions of privacy.285 There 
is, after all, much precedent for them to follow.286 And by 
                                                     
 281. For example, Grimshaw, the Ford Pinto case, resulted in damages, later reduced, 
of $125 million. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 771, 772 n.1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
 282. See, e.g., Dan Becker & James Gerstenzang, Safety Sacrificed in NHTSA 
Revolving Door, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/opinion/2015/02/25/nhtsa-revolving-door-cronyism-highway-column/23966219/ 
(citing inspector general report). 
 283. See Scott Evans, How NHTSA Missed the GM Ignition Switch Defect, 
MOTORTREND (June 15, 2015), http://www.motortrend.com/news/how-nhtsa-missed-the-
gm-ignition-switch-defect/. 
 284. Famous tort cases are not only taught to all law students in their Torts or 
Products Liability classes. They are part of popular culture: books and movies have been 
made about many. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (based on the Anderson 
v. Cryovac, the trichloroethylene toxic tort case in Woburn, Massachusetts); A CIVIL ACTION 
(Touchstone Pictures 1998). 
 285. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Privacy and Data Security Harms 
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with Author). 
 286. Courts have been recognizing intangible, emotional, and other non-pecuniary 
harms for decades. Indeed, Warren and Brandeis spent most of their article, The Right to 
 
Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)  2/12/2018  12:12 AM 
710 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [55:3 
vindicating these more intangible privacy rights, a renewed 
privacy tort regime can ensure that companies that collect data 
bring their privacy obligations out from under the shadow of data 
security. 
The capacity for law to influence design does not stop at 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and tort duties of reasonable care. Over 
the course of several interviews at major technology companies, I 
found that many of the designers who expressed a commitment to 
integrating privacy into design reflected on the impact of 
regulatory enforcement on their employers. “I’ve been here a long 
time, and we remember what it was like” under a consent decree. 
“No one wants to be the one who’s responsible for that happening 
again. We just don’t want to mess this up.”287 Another designer 
who works in artificial intelligence said bluntly: “We take this 
seriously, from my team all the way up to” the CEO of the company 
“because we don’t want that happening again, and it’s on us to 
make sure it doesn’t.”288 
But not all consent decrees are created equal. Google has been 
the subject of an FTC order,289 and so has Facebook.290 Neither 
have particularly good reputations for protecting user privacy and, 
with respect to Google, many of its current and former engineers 
report that the company’s vaunted privacy structures are 
relatively weak or inert.291 Strong regulatory interventions that 
require more than a “comprehensive privacy program,” together 
with executive- and management-level commitments to 
compliance, appear to be more effective. My interviews showed 
that employees working at companies who have experienced such 
powerful orders were far more capable of articulating specific ways 
they integrate privacy into design than those at companies where 
regulatory orders involved simple fines or one or two new hires. 
This suggests that the FTC should not be shy about imposing 
significant penalties and demanding comprehensive, specific 
                                                     
Privacy, proving that the common law has evolved to recognize intangible harms. See 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 245, at 193–94. 
 287. Interview with engineer at major technology company (Aug. 7, 2017) (notes on file 
with Author). The particular “consent decree” to which this interviewee referred is 
purposely omitted to maintain the confidentiality of the subject and his or her employer.  
 288. Interview with engineer focused on artificial intelligence at major technology 
company (Aug. 6, 2017) (notes on file with Author).  
 289. See, e.g., Decision and Order, In the Matter of Google, Inc., F.T.C. File No. 102 
3136, Docket No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf.  
 290. See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., 
F.T.C. File No 092 3184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf.  
 291. See supra notes 149–160 and accompanying text. 
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structural changes to companies that violate their users’ privacy 
expectations. 
C. Organizational Structure and Organizational Learning 
So far, we have discussed the role played by privacy theory and 
the legal relationship between users and data collectors—exogenous 
forces that help map the context in which technology companies 
operate—in pushing those companies to embed trust-based 
privacy norms into design. The next two sections address 
endogenous factors—corporate organization and the embodied 
experiences of technology workers themselves—and show how 
both may hinder the diffusion of norms throughout a given 
company. Changes that enhance organizational learning and 
expose engineers to new people, new ideas, and new perspectives, 
however, can make it more likely all parties in the design process 
share the same vision for privacy. 
Again, history is a guide. Sociological and management 
studies on the integration of social responsibility priorities into the 
corporate ethos, practice, and routine point to several 
organizational steps companies can take to change the status quo. 
Corporations, like all organized bureaucracies dedicated to 
achieving a particular purpose,292 use routines and internal 
practices to achieve their desired results and reduce uncertainty, 
mistakes, and deviation along the way.293 Sometimes, though, 
structures become ossified and stifle innovation.294 But corporate 
organization can be nudged to enhance organizational learning, or 
the process through which workers not only learn from each other, 
but also spread and embed new practices, new perspectives, and 
new norms.295 In these ways, organizational learning will help the 
CPO’s vision of privacy reach her workers on the ground. Based on 
that research and my interviews with technologists, three 
                                                     
 292. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 147. 
 293. The seminal work on the emergence of deviance, or behaviors that violate the 
norms of some group, in organizational practice is DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER 
LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 58, 102–18, 
148–52, 190–95, 405–09 (1996). 
 294. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 147 (bureaucracy is difficult to change 
once imposed). 
 295. See Amy C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in 
Organizations: A Group-Level Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES 
AND RELATIONSHIPS 631 (Mary Goodwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittel eds., 2012) [hereinafter, 
ORGANIZATIONS]. See also François Maon, Adam Lindgreen, & Valérie Swaen, Designing 
and Implementing Corporate Social Responsibility: An Integrative Framework Grounded in 
Theory and Practice, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 71, 71–72 (2008) (adoption of social responsibility 
strategy considered an organizational learning and change process). 
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structural limitations built into some corporate organizations 
have prevented robust privacy norms from reaching those 
designers: profit prioritization, departmental siloization, and 
instability in engineering staffing. This section addresses each in 
turn. 
Profit Prioritization and Company Climate. My interviews 
suggested that many technology companies recognized the 
revenue implications of incomplete data security,296 but not of poor 
consumer privacy. Indeed, the lack of internal corporate emphasis 
on privacy suggests that many companies approached it as 
another form of low-priority corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
while adopting the rhetoric of consumer privacy and trust. 
CSR programs are company initiatives that do not necessarily 
generate revenue but improve social welfare in some way.297 
Companies create them for many reasons,298 but they sometimes 
have to fight for attention against core corporate priorities.299 This 
is particularly true for privacy. The collection, use, and sale of 
consumer data are often integral to technology companies’ 
business models: Facebook and Google use personal data to sell 
targeted advertisements; dating websites promise compatible 
romantic matches in exchange for personal information and a 
monthly membership fee; and most online platforms collect data 
to optimize site performance and user experiences. Therefore, 
putting limitations on data collection would seem to be bad for 
business. 
But contrary to conventional wisdom, privacy is actually good 
for business. Companies that rely on consumers sharing 
information with them and with each other need their consumers’ 
trust.300 Without trust, sharing stops.301 And protecting our 
privacy is a central tool for gaining our trust, especially as we 
become more savvy Internet users. Even when privacy protections 
are seen as complications in a pure profit-seeking world based on 
data collection and analysis, protecting privacy can either give a 
company a competitive advantage on the market302 or prove its 
                                                     
 296. See, e.g., supra notes 122–128 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Aguilera et al., supra note 239, at 836–37. 
 298. See, e.g., Peter Arlow & Martin J. Gannon, Social Responsiveness, Corporate 
Structure, and Economic Performance, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 235, 236 (1982) (chief executive 
interest, powerful social movements, for example). 
 299. See, e.g., id. (reviewing literature showing only 1/5 of managers considered social 
responsibility a top five priority). 
 300. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 18, at 454. 
 301. See Waldman, Privacy As Trust, supra note 18. 
 302. See Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics 
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CSR bone fides. As Bamberger and Mulligan argued, it is the 
responsibility of the company’s executives to recognizes these 
opportunities. The CPO or CEO must raise awareness internally 
about privacy, set the tone for corporate action, and establish 
guideposts for marking success or failure. This type of executive 
responsibility is nothing new: Ikea executives set the tone for 
addressing the company’s use of child labor in the 1990s by talking 
about the company’s responsibility in the media, embedding 
opposition to the practice in a mission statement, and discussing 
their commitment to fighting the practice with managers and 
other employees.303 Apple’s Tim Cook did the same during his 
company’s fight with the FBI over the latter’s attempt to conscript 
Apple to bypass security features on the iPhone of Syed Farook, 
the man who killed 14 and injured 22 people at the Inland 
Regional Center in San Bernardino, California.304 In other words, 
executives, like the CPOs in Privacy on the Ground, have to 
establish what Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland called the 
“ostensive” aspect of a corporate routine on privacy, or the 
subjective understanding that consumer privacy is part of the 
corporate mission.305 
Empirical evidence bears this out. Oshrat Ayalon, Eran Toch, 
Irit Hadar, and Michael Birnhack recently showed that a 
corporate climate dedicated to privacy has a more significant 
impact on designers than formal policies, legal decisions, or 
continuing education.306 My interviews found the same: 
technologists at two different large technology companies, one 
with executives that take seriously issues like accessibility, social 
responsibility, and privacy, and one with executives that do not, 
had radically different approaches to integrating privacy into 
design. The former recognized privacy issues and evidenced a 
commitment to coming up with privacy fixes and even delaying or 
canceling product rollouts if it did not meet corporate privacy 
                                                     
and Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 411, 421–22 (1995) (ethical behavior can help a 
company achieve competitive advantage on the market); Michael V. Russo & Paul A. Fouts, 
A Resource Based Perspective on Corporate Environmental Performance and Profitability, 
40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 534, 535–36 (1997) (similar, focusing on environmental conduct). 
 303. See Maon, Lindgreen, & Swaen, supra note 295, at 78. 
 304. See A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/ 
customer-letter/; Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San 
Bernardino Gunman’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/02/18/technology/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html.  
 305. Feldman & Pentland, supra note 78, at 101. 
 306. Oshrat Ayalon et al., How Developers Make Design Decisions About Users’ 
Privacy: The Place of Professional Communities and Organizational Climate, in 
COMPANION OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE 
WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING (2017). 
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standards.307 The latter generally found it difficult to 
conceptualize privacy, let alone integrate it into their work. 
Departmental Siloization. Several engineers reported that 
their engineering teams were separated from other corporate 
departments, including privacy.308 But siloization is fatal to the 
diffusion of norms throughout a company. As Andrew Inkpen and 
Eric Tseng showed, corporate structures that separate networks 
of individuals erode trust and, as a result, prevent the exchange of 
information.309 We saw this happen at Google. Its large privacy 
and security structure was mostly separate from the engineering 
teams on the ground. As a result, several engineers resisted 
privacy professionals’ input. Siloization also had a negative effect 
on the privacy team’s work. Despite its robust structure, privacy 
at Google fell into a compliance role, with engineers briefly 
running their designs by privacy much like they would run them 
by the marketing or legal departments.310 
Not all design teams are so siloed. Several technologists at a 
large financial services firm spoke of working on design teams that 
were fully integrated into the larger corporate structure. Each 
team included a “risk and security” representative as well as a 
non-technologist manager who was not only responsible for 
facilitating cross-departmental connections, but also “had the 
knowledge base and trust of the other people that [technologists] 
had to work with.”311 Another engineer continued: 
We worked in teams, obviously with other engineers, but also 
with artistic designers, security people, a product manager, 
and a finance guy. The finance guy actually surprised me, 
but his job was actually pretty essential: if we’re designing 
for people like him, it was a great resource to have him in 
those [design] meetings.312 
This comment alludes to a radically different approach to 
design than the one reflected in many of my interviews with 
technologists. Not only was this team connected to the larger 
network of the corporation, it also included a stand-in for users, 
                                                     
 307. This is based on a series of interviews conducted with, among others, engineers 
and technologists at a large technology company over August 6 and 7, 2017 (notes on file 
with Author).  
 308. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 309. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 152–54. 
 310. See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text. 
 311. Telephone interview with engineer at large financial services company (1) (Oct. 
21, 2016) (notes on file with Author).  
 312. Telephone interview with engineer at financial services firm (2) (Oct. 26, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
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allowing the team to design for its customer base rather than for 
the engineers themselves. As a result, this team’s engineers 
learned from their coworkers.313 One engineer explained that “it 
was great to have the guy with a finance background on the team; 
he taught me a few things about how [the product] is used.”314 That 
learning was reflected in design in real ways: “he was integral in 
changing . . . design. He told us about desk clutter, the speed with 
which his colleagues use [the product], when they use it and how. 
I wouldn’t have known that stuff.” Although this team’s privacy 
member was really a “risk and security” expert, a privacy 
representative could raise consumer privacy issues much in the 
same way the finance professional raised issues from his own 
experience.315 
Instability in engineering staffing. Engineers reported a high 
degree of turnover among their teams.316 Such instability disrupts 
the diffusion and maintenance of strong organizational norms and 
culture.317 As Amy Edmondson, an expert on the work of teams in 
corporate environments, has shown, frequent staffing changes 
make it difficult for members of teams to trust one another. And 
without some level of trust—in a worker’ technical skill, dedication 
to the work, and commitment to others—team members do not 
have the confidence to reflect, ask challenging questions, and solve 
problems. Indeed, stable membership is essential for learning 
among team members: repeated interactions allow workers to 
share experiences and provide “psychological safety” for team 
members to challenge each other’s assumptions.318 
Attrition rates among engineers are high because of the 
demanding nature of the work at technology companies, where 
80-hour weeks are routine.319 Perks like Ping-Pong tables, fitness 
centers, on-site haircuts, and free food may attract new hires, but 
actually facilitate long hours in difficult conditions.320 To date, 
                                                     
 313. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 149, 154; Edmondson, supra note 295, 
at 632–33.  
 314. Financial services engineer (1) interview, supra note 311.  
 315. The integration of users into the design process is the subject of a long research 
agenda among sociologists of technology. For a collection of insightful essays on this topic, 
please see HOW USERS MATTER: THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF USERS AND TECHNOLOGY (Nelly 
Oudshoorn & Trevor Pinch eds., 2005). 
 316. See supra note 161. 
 317. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 153.  
 318. See Edmondson, supra note 295, at 633. 
 319. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor & David Streitfeld, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in 
a Bruising Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/ 
technology/inside-amazon-wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html?_r=0. 
 320. See also David Auerbach, I’ve Worked Insanely Demanding Tech Jobs, SLATE 
 
Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)  2/12/2018  12:12 AM 
716 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [55:3 
many technology companies approach their long hours as badges 
of honor and reflections of the high-achieving workers they hire. 
Plus, engineers can be replaced rather easily.321 Doing so at high 
rates, however, makes it difficult for company norms to embed 
within design teams on the ground. A more effective effort at 
retention can help change that. 
D. The Embodied Experience of Designers on the Ground 
Many of these organizational factors, which speak to the 
ability of a corporation as a whole to adapt and change, also apply 
to individual workers’ capacity to learn from each other. 
Individual-level learning is, of course, essential to embracing new 
organizational norms up and down the corporate hierarchy.322 
Engineers are not just trained robots; they perform their jobs323 
with particular perspectives, cognitive frames, and embodied 
experiences that translate into the products they design. As the 
interviews reported in this Article suggest, that background can 
sometimes act as a barrier to the diffusion of robust privacy norms. 
Some interviewees reported rarely, if ever, interacting with 
coworkers who were not also engineers. Some noted that the 
demands on them were so significant and constant,324 that when 
they were forced to make privacy-related decisions, they would fall 
back on their own judgment and education, the latter of which 
never included few, if any, references to privacy or ethics in design. 
Moreover, these engineers worked in teams whose members 
looked exactly like them: they came from the same backgrounds, 
schools, and family experiences.325 Exposing engineers to new 
people and new ideas through changes in technology education 
and increased social interaction within the corporation, however, 
can help change that. This section addresses both of those 
pathways, in turn. 
                                                     
(Aug. 17, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/08/ 
amazon_abuse_of_white_collar_workers_i_worked_at_microsoft_and_google_and.html 
(noting the attrition rate among technology workers). 
 321. See, e.g., Taylor Soper, Analysis: The Exploding Demand for Computer Science 
Education, and Why America Needs to Keep Up, GEEK WIRE (June 6, 2014, 10:51 AM), 
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/analysis-examining-computer-science-education-explosion/. 
 322. See Edmondson, supra note 295, at 632 (organizations cannot change when they 
ignore the experiences of their workers). 
 323. In Feldman’s and Pentland’s two-tiered framework for understanding corporate 
routines, executives establish the “ostensive” aspect, or guiding mission and understanding, 
of the routine, while workers on the ground “perform” the routine or translate the mission 
into practice. See Feldman & Pentland, supra note 78, at 101. 
 324. See Start-up programmer interview, supra note 141. 
 325. See Silicon Valley engineer interview, supra note 161. 
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The cognitive frames through which we see the world and 
approach new problems326 are significantly influenced by our 
education. But most technology companies hire their engineers 
from the same schools, most of which neglect to include privacy 
and ethics in their curricula. I conducted a LinkedIn search for 
technology talent at Google, Facebook, and Apple and found that 
nearly 38% come from just the top 5 engineering and computer 
science programs in the United States, as rated by U.S. News and 
World Report.327 Those curricula are quite similar, and notable in 
several respects. 
 The first notable characteristic of technology education in the 
United States is that there is severe demographic inequality in 
engineering and computer science faculties. The imbalance is 
worst at Stanford’s electrical engineering department, where only 
7 out of 63 faculty members are women (11.1%).328 Stanford also 
has the worst gender imbalance in its computer science faculty, 
where only 5 out of 57 are women. That means there are nearly 12 
men for every one woman. At the University of Illinois, which has 
the fifth highest ranked computer science program in the country, 
there are 13 women on a faculty of 74. MIT fares the best: 18.5% 
of its Electrical Engineering and Computer Science faculty are 
women.329 Racial and ethnic diversity is even worse. There is not 
                                                     
 326. See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially 
Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 946, 946–47 (2007) (discussing the literature). 
 327. To calculate this estimate, I searched for all LinkedIn members who listed 
“engineer” as their job and Google, Facebook, or Apple as a place of employment, either 
current or former. I then filtered those results by education, searching for the top 5 
engineering and computer science programs, as listed by U.S. News and World Report. See 
Best Undergraduate Engineering Programs, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 
https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/engineering (last visited Jan. 22, 2018); 
Best Undergraduate Computer Engineering Programs, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 
https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/engineering-doctorate-computer (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018). These data are imperfect: only a subset of technology talent at these 
companies have LinkedIn profiles and only a subset of them list their education. That said, 
the purpose of including this statistic is not to argue that it represents the entire 
population. My goal is more modest: to show that there is reason to believe there is a high 
concentration of engineering talent from the top 5 schools in the United States at major 
technology companies. This is not controversial. Max Nisen, What Facebook, Twitter, Google, 
and Apple Employees Have in Common, QUARTZ (Mar. 7, 2014), https://qz.com/183958/what-
facebook-twitter-google-and-apple-employees-have-in-common/. 
 328. The gender imbalance at the other top 5 engineering programs is as follows: 
Berkeley’s Electrical Engineering and Computer Science faculty and CalTech’s Electrical 
Engineering faculty are only 12.5% women (17 out of 136 and 3 out of 24, respectively). At 
Georgia Tech’s Electrical Engineering and Computer Science program, 13.2% of faculty are 
women (19 out of 143). 
 329. At Carnegie Mellon, 16 out of 101 (15.8%) are women. At Berkeley, 10 out of 84 
(11.9%) are women. 
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a single black or Latino/a faculty member in CalTech’s engineering 
department. Larger faculties are also homogeneous. At Berkeley’s 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science department, there 
is one black faculty member and not a single Latino/a. Illinois’s 
computer science faculty has the same numbers (or lack thereof). 
In total, if you aggregate the faculties at the top five computer 
science schools, there are only seven black and twelve Latino/a 
faculty members. In engineering departments, there are ten black 
faculty members and only two Latino/as. There is not a single 
openly queer person on the electrical engineering and computer 
science faculties at any of the top five schools.330 
But numbers tell only part of the story. Women who make it 
through the patriarchal gauntlet to find a technology job face 
hostility and discrimination when they get there. Studies show 
that women in technology careers are belittled, condescended to, 
ignored, and hear sexually harassing language in the office.331 It 
is no wonder that although many young girls express interest in 
tech careers, only 11% of teenage women actually expect to go into 
the field.332 And queer engineers are forced into the closet by 
                                                     
 330. These imbalances manifest outside the classroom and help embed implicit biases. In 
March 2017, Goldman Sachs hosted a two-day technology conference in which 93% of the 
speakers were men. Matthew Zeitlin, This Goldman Sachs Conference Has 76 Speakers  
and Only Five Are Women, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:52 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/matthewzeitlin/this-goldman-sachs-conference-has-76-speakers-
and-only-five?utm_term=.geNR2RKPK#.do0747ePe. The year before, there was an all-male 
panel on women’s equality at Davos. Jessica Roy, All-Male Panel About Women’s Equality Not 
Exactly Equal, THE CUT (Jan. 22, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.thecut.com/2016/01/davos-all-
male-panel-on-womens-equality.html. PayPal did the same thing in April 2016. Dayna Evans, 
Ah, Yes: Another All-Male Panel on the Issue of Gender Equality, THE CUT (Apr. 21, 2016, 5:52 
PM), https://www.thecut.com/2016/04/paypal-to-hold-all-male-panel-on-gender-equality.html. 
Male-only panels at technology conferences are so common that the phenomenon spawned a 
satirical blog (“Congrats, You Have an All-Male Panel!”), a game of Female Conference Speaker 
Bingo, and even a portmanteau (“manel”). See Congrats, You Have an All-Male Panel, 
http://allmalepanels.tumblr.com/;Elan Morgan, Good Read: Jezebel’s Female Conference Speaker 
Bingo, GENDER AVENGER (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.genderavenger.com/blog/2014/2/25/an-
oldie-but-a-goodie-jezebels-female-conference-speaker-bingo. This isn’t surprising, given the 
inequality that exists in the field, but it’s easily remedied: there are literally thousands of women 
working in technology who can step in. Melanie Ehrenkranz, Think There Aren’t Any Qualified 
Women in Tech? Here are 1,000 Names. No More Excuses., MIC (May 2, 2017), 
https://mic.com/articles/175136/women-in-tech-1000-names-no-more-all-male-panels-
conferences#.rUuZ3XO37. The continued silencing of women’s voices, however, shows one way 
that the lack of diversity among technology faculty follows technologists wherever they go, 
helping to entrench and reinforce gender, racial, and sexual stereotypes. 
 331. See Nadya A. Fouad, Leaning in, but Getting Pushed Back (and Out), 
Presentation at the American Psychology Association Annual Convention, August 2014, 
available at https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/08/pushed-back.pdf.See also 
Kate Conger, Exclusive: Here’s the Full 10-Page Anti-Diversity Screed Circulating 
Internally at Google [Updated], GIZMODO (Aug. 5, 2017, 7:25 PM ET), 
http://gizmodo.com/exclusive-heres-the-full-10-page-anti-diversity-screed-1797564320. 
 332. See Jillian Berman, Teenage Boys and Girls Are Choosing Very Different Careers, 
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deeply entrenched heteronormativity.333 Lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual engineering students have reported hearing frequent 
expressions of sexual prejudice and have to navigate demands for 
conformity by compartmentalizing their lives, staying in the 
closet, and depriving themselves of social connections.334 Gay male 
engineering students often feel the need to “cover” or “pass” as 
heterosexual because nonconformity is frowned upon.335 Queer 
engineering students reported being told that issues of sexuality 
and gender identity are “irrelevant” in engineering.336 What’s 
more, prevailing gender norms in the industry mean that they 
would be discredited or ignored as engineers if they came out; in 
other words, they would be (mis)treated by their peers the same 
way those peers (mis)treat women.337 Because heterosexual 
students face none of these oppressive demands, their academic 
experiences are likely more fulfilling and less stressful.338 
The lack of women, persons of color, and queer technologists 
and the absence of diverse faculty at leading engineering and 
computer science programs impacts designing for privacy directly 
and indirectly. Homogeneity directly factors into design. Many 
designers I interviewed suggested it was difficult to design for 
diverse audiences, so they excluded diversity metrics from the 
design process and failed to grapple with the sometimes-differing 
privacy needs of different social groups. This has real, 
demonstrable effects on the ground. According to a comprehensive 
study by ProPublica, software that calculated recidivism risk in 
criminals was racist: it was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black 
defendants as being at a higher risk of committing future crimes 
and twice as likely to incorrectly flag white defendants as low 
                                                     
MARKETWATCH (June 5, 2017, 9:32 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/teenage-boys-
and-girls-are-choosing-very-different-careers-2017-06-01 (reporting on a survey of 1000 13 
to 17-year olds conducted by Junior Achievement, a youth-focused nonprofit organization). 
 333. See Erin A. Cech & Tom J. Waidzunas, Navigating the Heteronormativity of 
Engineering: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Students, 3 ENGINEERING 
STUD. 1, 2–3 (2011). 
 334. Id. at 8–11. In many ways, the experiences of the engineering students 
interviewed by Cech and Waidzunas mirror the experiences of queer service members in 
the United States military before the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”. In both cases, 
queer individuals were forced to erase their personal lives and have to constantly navigate 
social situations in ways that would reduce the risk of being outed. See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670–73 
(1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2012)). 
 335. See Cech & Waidzunas, supra note 333, at 13. See also KENJI YOSHINO, 
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). 
 336. Id. at 11. 
 337. Id. at 12. 
 338. Id. at 2. 
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risk.339 Indirectly, the lack of diversity on any metric tends to stifle 
innovative problem solving.340 Engineers from the same 
background might approach in similar ways; engineers who have 
had different life experiences, particularly with technology, may 
be able to spot privacy issues and work through them in ways 
others can’t. And designing for privacy in a profit-seeking world 
often requires creative, outside-the-box thinking because 
companies to look at design in new ways. Two heads are better the 
one, but only if the heads aren’t identical. 
Another feature of technology education today is that both 
privacy and ethics are inconspicuous in engineering schools’ 
course catalogs and curricula. The California Institute of 
Technology, commonly known as CalTech, is one of the highest 
ranking undergraduate electrical engineering programs in the 
United States.341 Neither the words “privacy” nor “security”, or 
derivations thereof, are used in the descriptions of the program’s 
required courses or recommended electives.342 In the school’s 
entire course catalog, the word privacy fares a little better, but the 
opportunities are a little far afield. The computer science and 
social science curricula jointly offer an elective called “Introduction 
to Data Privacy,” which covers several important topics, including 
defining privacy and the tradeoff between “useful computation on 
large datasets and the privacy of those from whom the data is 
derived,” and reaches beyond the engineering silo to leverage work 
from “economics, statistics, information theory, game theory, 
probability, learning theory, geometry, and approximation 
algorithms” to better understand privacy from a “mathematical” 
perspective.343 There is also a political science course called “The 
Supreme Court in U.S. History,” which, among other topics, covers 
privacy and the Fourth Amendment.344 And CalTech’s science 
departments offer “Social Media for Scientists,” which teaches 
                                                     
 339. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 
 340. L. Richard Hoffman & Norman R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem 
Solving by Members of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. Abnormal & Social 
Psych. 401, 404 (1961). See also MARVIN E. SHAW, RHONA ROBBIN, & JAMES R. BELSER, 
GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR (1981) (reviewing the 
research on the effect of group heterogeneity on problem solving). 
 341. See Best Undergraduate Engineering Programs, supra note 327. 
 342. See Undergraduate Program, CAL. INST. OF TECH.: DEPT. OF ELECTRICAL ENG’G, 
http://ee.caltech.edu/academics/ugrad; Courses, CAL. INST. OF TECH.: DEPT. OF ELECTRICAL 
ENG’G, http://ee.caltech.edu/academics/course_desc. 
 343. See CAL. INST. OF TECH., CALTECH CATALOG, at 508 (2016), http://catalog.caltech.edu/ 
documents/85-catalog_16_17.pdf. 
 344. Id. at 596. 
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students how to engage with other members of their professions 
over social media. The class touches on personal privacy issues 
associated with using social media platforms.345 
Even though these electives exist, they are easy to avoid. The 
Data Privacy class at CalTech was offered only once in the last 
three years.346 And the course plans, recommended course 
schedules, and preferred electives pushed by the school do not 
include these classes.347 Admittedly, CalTech may be a special 
case; its reputation sets it apart. But the pattern was repeated 
elsewhere. An engineering graduate student at Columbia 
University’s Fu Foundation School for Engineering and Applied 
Scientists told me that electives focusing on privacy issues in 
engineering are “hidden from most students; you can avoid all of 
it if you want to. These are things that I am interested in, and, as 
a result, I’ve been intentional about accessing them. I can’t say the 
same for my colleagues.”348 A graduate student at the University 
of Washington’s Department of Electrical Engineering noted that 
she too “had to go out of [her] way” to find classes on policy, ethics, 
and privacy.349 And that’s true at most schools, even at an 
engineering school like Columbia’s, which requires all of its 
undergraduate engineering students to participate in the broader 
college’s Core Curriculum of social science, history, and other non-
technical courses. In practice, the requirement may not help 
engineers understand the social, ethical, and legal contexts in 
which they do their work. As the graduate student noted, students 
“can take the least relevant parts of the core, like a class on salsa 
and reggae dance”350 and still fulfill their graduation requirements 
without ever taking a course on privacy. 
Hiring the same types of engineers from the same types of 
engineering programs with the same types of education that 
neglect privacy and ethics tends to make otherwise distinct 
companies look identical. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell called 
this “isomorphism,” and it creates an environment where everyone 
has similar perspectives on the same problem.351 This exacerbates 
                                                     
 345. Id. at 479. 
 346. Id. at 508; CAL. INST. OF TECH., CALTECH CATALOG at 488 (2015), 
http://catalog.caltech.edu/documents/1-catalog_15_16.pdf; CAL. INST. OF TECH., CALTECH 
CATALOG (2014), at 483, http://catalog.caltech.edu/documents/14-catalog_14_15.pdf. 
 347. See Undergraduate Program, supra note 342. 
 348. Telephone interview with graduate student at Columbia University (Aug. 30, 
2017) (notes on file with Author). 
 349. Interview with engineering doctoral student at the University of Washington, 
Seattle, WA (Aug. 9, 2017) (notes on file with Author). 
 350. Id. 
 351. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 78, at 147, 149, 153. 
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the diversity problem within the technology community and 
makes individual learning and creative approaches difficult.352 As 
social networks scholars know well, it is difficult for new ideas to 
break into tightly clustered homophilous networks.353 We see this 
everyday with our echo chamber networks of friends on Facebook. 
In technology product design, the effect of isomorphic hiring of 
engineers with similar backgrounds is the silencing of new ideas, 
different perspectives, and privacy concerns. 
Legal education may be increasingly embracing privacy, but 
it often remains technologically averse. Only about 20-25% of law 
schools offer a class in information privacy.354 Alongside Internet 
Law or Cyberlaw, information privacy courses expose students to 
some technologies that implicate privacy issues. Dan Solove’s and 
Paul Schwartz’s privacy law casebook, for example, includes cases 
on networked technologies, heat sensors, GPS, wiretaps, email, 
computers, encryption, video surveillance, online searches, and 
much more.355 But, outside of occasionally providing general 
summaries of how relevant technologies work, court opinions can 
only take law students so far. Most law students major in non-
technical fields in college.356 They may now come to law school 
with facility in using technology, but many lack a willingness to 
understand how they work. I found some evidence of this in my 
interviews with privacy lawyers in private firms. “Thank god I 
don’t have to be an engineer to draft changes to a privacy policy,” 
a junior attorney at a large, highly-regarded law firm in New York 
                                                     
 352. Despite such drawbacks, employers still tend to hire from the same schools as 
their competitors because it offers a sense of legitimacy in the industry. Law firms, 
investment banks, and pharmaceutical companies do this, as well. See id. at 148. 
 353. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 
1 SOC. THEORY 201, 202 (1983). See also Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, & James M. 
Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 415, 429 
(2001). The original and seminal work on homophily was from two of the most American 
famous social theorists of the last century, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton. See Paul 
F. Lazarsfeld & Robert K. Merton, Friendship as A Social Process: A Substantive and 
Methodological Analysis, in FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN MODERN SOCIETY 18–66 (M. 
BERGER ED. 1954). 
 354. See Daniel J. Solove, Why All Law Schools Should Teach Privacy Law—and Why 
Many Don’t, TEACH PRIVACY: PRIVACY + SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.teachprivacy.com/law-schools-teach-privacy-law-many-dont/. 
 355. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 180–88, 
318–26, 326–35, 365–410 (5th ed. 2015). 
 356. According to information from the Law School Admissions Council, the ten most 
common majors among law school applicants in the 2015–2016 academic year were, in order, 
political science, criminal justice, psychology, English, history, economics, philosophy, arts and 
humanities, sociology, and communications. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, 
UNDERGRADUATE MAJORS OF APPLICANTS TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2016), 
https://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/data-(lsac-resources)-docs/2015-16_applicants-major.pdf. 
 
Waldman_EIC Edit Complete (Do Not Delete)  2/12/2018  12:12 AM 
2018] DESIGNING WITHOUT PRIVACY 723 
City.357 Another young lawyer at a different firm stated that “no 
technical background required” could be the slogan for his 
technology law education.358 Partners at these firms are quick to 
point out that they are eagerly searching for tech talent, even 
outside the narrow confines of patent practice groups, which often 
hire law students with technical degrees.359 They recognize that 
technological expertise can help: “I would love an engineer on my 
cases. They look at problems differently, sure, which helps, but 
sometimes a client has a new device or a problem that started 
online and my 12-year-old daughter is more equipped to 
understand it than I am. No joke.”360 This kind of self-deprecation 
and admission to a lack of technical skills was quite common. 
Granted, lawyers do not need to be lawyers and engineers at 
the same time. But lawyers’ lack of technical awareness limits 
their ability to help integrate privacy into design in several ways. 
First, a limited knowledge base can erode confidence in one’s 
ability to affect positive change. Several in-house lawyers at major 
technology companies suggested that they were disinclined to take 
the initiative and reach out to engineers during design because 
they “couldn’t contribute.”  “I’m not a coder. I don’t want to get in 
the way,” one lawyer conceded.361 As a result, lawyers don’t get 
involved even when they might be the ones most able to spot 
privacy issues as they come up in design. Second, an inability to 
speak with or relate to engineers on their level erodes trust. Trust 
is important among members of teams. Without some level of 
trust—in a worker’ technical skill, dedication to the work, and 
commitment to others—team members do not have the confidence 
to reflect, ask challenging questions, and solve problems. Indeed, 
trust allows workers to share experiences and provides 
“psychological safety” for team members to challenge each other’s 
assumptions.362 To gain that level of trust with engineers, lawyers 
                                                     
 357. Telephone interview with associate at AmLaw Top 100 law firm (Sept. 30, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 358. Telephone interview with junior associate at litigation firm (July 28, 2017) (notes 
on file with Author). 
 359. Technical education is a requirement of sitting for the Patent Bar Exam. See U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE, GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO 
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
4–5 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/OED_GRB.pdf. Notably, one does not 
need a technical requirement to be a patent litigator or join patent-related cases. 
 360. Telephone interview with partner at AmLaw Top 50 law firm (2) (Aug. 19, 2016) 
(notes on file with Author). 
 361. Interview with in-house attorney at mid-size technology company, San Francisco, 
CA (Aug. 12, 2016) (notes on file with Author). 
 362. See Amy C. Edmondson, The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in 
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need to “speak their language.”363 A senior lawyer at large 
technology company who serves as the legal point person for 
several design teams told me that it is “important to learn about 
the product, be passionate about it, do research on it so I can talk 
intelligently about what my [engineers] are doing. Otherwise, my 
[engineers] would see me as an impediment, not a teammate, and 
I am a member of the team.”364 
Changes in both education and within the corporation can 
fight isomorphism and its effects. Privacy should be integrated 
into required courses for undergraduate and graduate students, 
and it should be distinguished from security. The ethics of design, 
along with a basic education on the legal context in which 
engineers design technology products, should also be required. 
Although many schools are seeing higher rates of female 
applicants, schools must do a better job recruiting women, persons 
of color, LGBTQ students, and other candidates from diverse 
backgrounds. Notably, a similar cross-disciplinary approach to 
legal education can foster greater interaction between privacy 
lawyers and engineers. At Georgetown University Law Center, for 
example, Paul Ohm worked with the Staff Technologist at the 
school’s Center on Privacy and Technology to create a course, 
“Computer Program for Lawyers: An Introduction,” to not only 
train lawyers in a vital skill they can use in practice, but also to 
familiarize future attorneys with the technology world in which 
many of their clients work.365 The Center also runs more informal 
seminars on law and policy issues raised by new technologies. At 
New York Law School, a new program, the Technology for Lawyers 
Working Group, exposes law students and lawyers to important 
and pervasive technologies and discusses the legal, ethic, and 
policy issues they raise. This interdisciplinary education is not 
meant to turn lawyers into engineers, but it can help engineers 
and lawyers better relate to each other and build the trust 
necessary for cooperation. 
Norm diffusion and exposure to new ideas must also happen 
within a company. As large networks of people working under the 
                                                     
Organizations: A Group-Level Perspective, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES 
AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 295, at 633.  
 363. Interview with lawyer at large technology company (Aug. 8, 2017) (notes on file 
with author). 
 364. Id. 
 365. See Computer Programming for Lawyers: An Introduction, GEORGETOWN UNIV., 
https://apps.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/tab_courses.cfm?Status=Course&Detail=272
3 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018). 
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same umbrella,366 corporations are perfectly suited to norm and 
knowledge transfer.367 Indeed, that is what social networks do: 
information is exchanged through the ties that connect individuals 
to others in their network and in others’ networks.368 Therefore, 
any corporation that fosters social interaction among diverse 
employees from different departments will have stronger social 
networks among its employees and robust platforms through 
which trust can be built and experiences, ideas, and norms can be 
shared.369 Many technology companies do not do that. Some of the 
engineers who work or had worked for large and mid-size Silicon 
Valley technology companies noted that they often only saw or 
interacted with other engineers. They sit together in open plans, 
their bosses are coders, and they are often situated in buildings 
that have their own cafeterias, entertainment, and fitness centers. 
As a result, their networks are closed, keeping out voices that 
could diversify design.370 
Several concrete steps already in place in many companies 
can help deploy social networks to help embed strong privacy 
norms among technologists: integrated design teams expose 
engineers to other perspectives, strong affinity groups can bring 
together engineers and privacy professionals, and locating 
employees in a single location can make serendipitous interaction 
more likely. As more of those interactions take place, the more 
likely engineers will hear perspectives that challenge their 
cognitive frames. That can only improve a design process plagued 
by isolation, siloization, and implicit biases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article began where Kenneth Bamberger’s and Deirdre 
Mulligan’s research left off. Their book, Privacy on the Ground, 
explored how leading CPOs were moving their companies far 
beyond the minimal requirements of privacy law on the books. But 
it was not clear that their dynamic, forward-looking, and 
trust-based approach to privacy has been embedded throughout 
their companies. After all, CPOs are not designers and many of 
the technology products we use today seem to be designed without 
                                                     
 366. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 148 (a corporation is a vertical, structured 
network). 
 367. Id. at 146. 
 368. See Granovetter, supra note 98, at 1363–66. 
 369. See Inkpen & Tseng, supra note 241, at 154. See also Carrie R. Leana & Harry J. 
Van Buren III, Organizational Social Capital and Employment Practices, in SOCIOLOGY OF 
ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 295, at 41–46 (companies 
can build social capital through robust employee social networks). 
 370. See Granovetter, supra note 98, at 1363–69.  
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our privacy in mind. Given those questions, I interviewed 
engineers, computer programmers, and other technologists, as 
well as lawyers in private firms, to determine how, if at all, the 
professionals creating products and user notices integrated 
privacy into their work. This research revealed a parallel 
narrative, one much more likely to make its way into design. 
Where CPOs wanted to push their companies to go beyond the law, 
their lawyers limited their conception of privacy to notice-and-
choice. Where CPOs saw themselves as stewards of their 
customers’ data in an ongoing social exchange, their engineers saw 
their privacy obligations as ending with data security and 
encryption. Where CPOs felt that users and evolving user 
expectations were essential to their work, many technologists 
resisted any role for the user in the design process. Where CPOs 
wanted privacy integrated into business units, the reality on the 
ground saw siloed privacy teams and engineers making privacy 
decisions on the fly. 
The existence of this parallel narrative suggests that robust 
privacy norms are not always trickling down from the CPOs to 
their designers on the ground. This is not to say that those norms 
never reach designers. There are many technology company 
employees working earnestly to create exciting products and 
platforms while protecting privacy. This Article is not to meant to 
suggest otherwise. But there are still barriers to privacy by design 
at some companies. This Article proposed a four-tiered approach 
for both understanding those barriers and suggesting how to fix 
them. Ambiguous privacy theory, significant gaps in privacy law, 
siloization and misplaced priorities within the corporation, and 
homogenous design teams are ossifying technologists’ perspectives 
and creating resistance to the CPOs’ vision of privacy. Changes at 
each level, however, could both incentivize companies to take 
privacy seriously and enhance organizational learning and 
change. 
This research is necessarily limited. Ethnographic research is 
subject to response biases where respondents try to give the 
answers they think the researcher wants to hear. My observations 
of design meetings are particularly susceptible to these biases. 
Also, a small group of interviews based on snowball sampling 
cannot represent the population of technologists as a whole, 
limiting the generalizability of this research. Undoubtedly, there 
are companies that do better than others at integrating privacy 
into the design process. Further research will discuss how certain 
businesses in certain industries manage to be more successful at 
making robust privacy norms part of the routine of every 
employee. Generalizing to the entire technology industry is not the 
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goal of this Article. Rather, it speaks to a world in which the 
privacy goals set by CPOs at the top of a corporation may not be 
fully realized. This may, in some cases, prevent robust privacy 
norms from making their way into design. 
Despite any research limitations, this Article points to several 
avenues for future research. A longitudinal study comparing the 
privacy elements of products from agile design teams with those of 
siloed, homogenous teams could prove the impact of diversity and 
integrated teams on privacy by design. Additional research on 
technology education is needed to determine how best to integrate 
ethics, diversity, and privacy into computer science and 
engineering curricula. And quantitative research can assess the 
impact of organizational changes, team demographics, and other 
factors on user trust in a company. These projects are all planned 
or in progress. This Article is just one step in a larger research 
agenda on making privacy by design more of a reality than a 
buzzword. 
 
